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I. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary assessment of the competitive effects of information
sharing among competitors is a showcase of the duality of public policy and
antitrust law towards cooperation: Scholars recognize the potential anti-
competitive effects of information sharing among competitors but at the
same time acknowledge the social benefits derived from this business prac-
tice.' In particular, the literature emphasizes the social benefits of coordina-
tion in network industries.2
These are the positive and negative effects of information sharing on
social welfare. But when deciding whether to share information, firms con-
sider their private welfare. Discrepancies between social and private welfare
may therefore lead firms to share information excessively to anticompetitive
ends-in facilitating of cartels and other harmful horizontal practices: Anti-
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George Mason University School of Law to both authors, the Law and Economics Center at George
Mason University School of Law to the first author, and the Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Busi-
ness at Harvard Law School to the second author. Participants in the Sloan workshop at Georgetown
Law Center and the Airlie House conference of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Project at George
Mason University School of Law provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law, and Fellow at the Criti-
cal Infrastructure Protection Project. LL.B. (Tel-Aviv University, 1995); LL.M. (University of Chicago,
2000); J.S.D. (University of Chicago, 2003).
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I. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, with
Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 446, 457 (1983) (pointing out the effi-
ciency, and even necessity, of coordination among competitors in certain industries).
2. Id.; Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
615, 620-23 (2000) (discussing how, absent coordination between platform manufacturer and application
manufacturer, positive externalities of each on the other result in excessive pricing or sub-optimal qual-
ity). This characteristic is common in critical infrastructures.
3. See, e.g., Josh A. Goldfoot, Antitrust Implications of Internet Administration, 84 VA. L. REV.
909(1998).
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trust scholarship and case law have paid the latter problem much attention,
and the analysis of anticompetitive coordination among competitors is quite
sophisticated.4
Hitherto, however, legal analysts paid far less attention to another im-
portant type of discrepancy between the socially optimal and the likely pri-
vate level of information sharing among competitors-that is, the problem
of sub-optimal information sharing. Sub-optimal information sharing can
generate significant social costs and is of special significance in network
industries (including most critical infrastructures) because the maintenance
of compatibility, which is key to producing positive network effects, typi-
cally requires information sharing.5
Understanding the neglected impact of sub-optimal information sharing
is important for many areas of antitrust analysis, such as the evaluation of
coordinated effects resulting from a merger;6 the assessment of whether a
joint venture is an illegal restraint of trade;7 and the construction of condi-
The prohibition of horizontal restraints [such as information sharing and other cartel fa-
cilitating practices] attempts to police externalities by eliminating them, rather than by creat-
ing rights that third parties can agree to sell. Although horizontal restraints are profitable to
their participants, they impose a cost on others by reducing the available number of contract
choices. Normally, assigning the extemality-affected party a property right it can sell or use
to enjoin the externality-generating party maximizes efficiency. With horizontal restraints,
however, it would be impractical to give third parties property rights in the market structure,
allowing them to negotiate with the horizontal restraint participants, because horizontal re-
straints would affect so many market participants that the danger of holdouts would be high.
Furthermore, economic theory would predict that such a transaction would never occur. Be-
cause the gains to cartel participants from setting prices are always less than the losses suf-
fered by their customers, customers would require too high a price for their property right for
the externality sale to be profitable to the cartel participants.
Antitrust regulations such as section I of the Sherman Act attempt to prevent such an ex-
traction of rents completely by limiting parties' ability to cooperate.
Id. at 930-31 (footnotes omitted).
4. For a description of the contemporary analytic framework used by U.S. antitrust enforcement
agencies to assess information exchange and other collaborations among competitors, see Fed. Trade
Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 13,161 (April 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf
[hereinafter JV Guidelines].
5. See, e.g., David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation and Antitrust, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465
(1994).
Compatibility standards are essential if products and their complements are to be used in
a system. Computers need software, compact disc players need compact discs, televisions
need programs, and bolts need nuts. Compatibility standards define the format for the inter-
face between the core and complementary goods, so that, for example, compact disc players
from any manufacturer may use compact discs from any music company.
To establish common standards, meetings and exchanges of technical information are of-
ten necessary.
Id. at 473-74.
6. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 (Sept. 10, 1992), available at
http:llwww.ftc.gov/bc/docslhorizmer.htm. Section 2.1 considers the likelihood that a firm would have
access to certain information about competitors as a factor that increases the likelihood that the firm
would agree with rivals on terms of a collusive agreement and would be able to detect and punish devia-
tions from those terms. Thus, a higher likelihood that information on a rival would be acquired via
information sharing increases the risk that a merger would be challenged as likely to cause harm to
competition.
7. See JV Guidelines, supra note 4, at section 3.34(e) (considering likelihood of anticompetitive
232
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tions in divestiture agreements pursuant to antitrust enforcement actions.8 In
all of these areas, an overstatement of the likelihood of information sharing
among competitors can lead to an illegalization of, or the imposition of ex-
cessive restrictions on, some beneficial horizontal arrangements or transac-
tions.
Moreover, the analysis of sub-optimal information sharing is also cen-
tral to the formulation of public policy regarding network industries and
critical infrastructures more generally.9 For instance, the National Strategy
for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,
adopted in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and intended to
map the future direction of national security policy, identified as a priority
the achievement of a better understanding of impediments to security-
related information sharing, to increase the security of privately owned or
controlled critical infrastructures. ' 0
Finally, a more accurate assessment of the likelihood of information
sharing has implications not only for substantive law and public policy, but
it also may advance the analysis of procedural rules. To wit, an important
consideration in civil procedure, when shaping the rules of pre-litigation
discovery proceedings (e.g., by deciding the scope of a privilege), is facili-
tating "free and open exchange of information during the presuit screening
information sharing as a criterion in assessing the legality of a joint venture). See also United States v.
Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,687 (D.D.C. 1994) (competitive impact state-
ment), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4700/4797.pdf (discussing antitrust charges brought
by the Department of Justice alleging collusion between airlines facilitated by coded signals in informa-
tion provided by the airlines to a computer reservation system).
8. See, e.g., United States v. SBC Communications, Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,631
(D.D.C. 1999) (arguing that terms in a consent decree approving a merger subject to a divestiture, which
prohibit the divesting company and the trustee responsible for the divestiture from exchanging non-
public information, are "safeguards" that "protect against any competitive harm that could arise from
coordinated behavior or information sharing between the two cellular systems after the merger, during
the limited period while sale of the Cellular System Assets is not yet complete"); United States v. Sprint
Corp., 1995 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,300 (D.D.C. 1995) (prohibiting parties to a consent decree
from seeking non-public data about future prices or pricing plans of competitors, because "[rlisks of
price collusion, tacit or explicit, are considerable in an industry with a small number of large providers
offering similar types of services"). Inevitably, the conditions in both of the above consent decrees
constrain some efficient transactions. Their justification, therefore, lies in their preventing anticompeti-
tive information exchange that would otherwise take place.
9. An example of a network industry in which the scope of likely information sharing among rivals
is directly regulated (and thus can be informed by this Article's analysis) is the natural gas industry, in
which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates information sharing among pipelines and
their affiliates. See FERC Order No. 497 (June 14, 1988). See also Tenneco Gas v. FERC, 969 F.2d
1187 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing these orders).
10. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures
and Key Assets (Feb. 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical-Strategy.pdf [hereinafter
The National Strategy].
Information sharing underpins any true partnership [between government and industry to pro-
tect critical infrastructures) and is necessary to mitigate the threat posed by a cunning, adap-
tive, and determined enemy. To formulate comprehensive security plans and make informed
security investment and action decisions, individuals and institutions alike require timely, ac-
curate, and relevant information. Accordingly, we must adopt measures to identify and evalu-
ate potential impediments or disincentives to security-related information sharing and formu-
late appropriate measures to overcome these barriers.
Id. at 12-13.
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process."' The less likely free exchange is to occur, however, the lower the
expected benefit from promulgating discovery rules that are intended to
enable such an exchange. Thus, insofar as the extant scholarship overstates
the likelihood of information exchange among litigants, the impediments to
information sharing examined in this Article may provide useful insights
regarding the efficacy and proper scope of discovery and privilege. 1
2
This Article advances the scholarly understanding of impediments 3 to
information sharing in a number of significant ways. First, it shows that the
strategic behavior of competitors may erect an economic barrier to informa-
tion sharing that has not been previously addressed in the legal literature-
the fear of degradation. Second, this Article reveals a hitherto unrecognized
set of behavioral impediments to information sharing. Third, it integrates
these economic and behavioral insights with the findings of the extant litera-
ture to create a new framework for predicting when private information
sharing will be sub-optimal. Finally, this Article provides some tentative
suggestions for aligning private information sharing with social optimality
based on the framework developed here.
Structurally, Part II of the Article reviews the extant literature on infor-
mation sharing focusing on the long-understood problem of free riding-
that is, the ability of one actor freely (or more cheaply) to enjoy the benefits
of the information its counterpart has produced at a cost. The risk of rivals'
free riding reduces the incentive of each firm to collect and share informa-
tion. 
14
Part III provides a novel discussion of the problem of degradation-
namely, the private costs competitors must bear when sharing private in-
formation to their rivals' benefit.'- This section challenges the common
II. Cohen v. Dauphinee, 739 So. 2d 68, 72 (Fla. 1999) (discussing where a pre-suit affidavit that
was required to initiate a medical malpractice action was protected from discovery and could not be
admitted, because "free and open exchange of information will more likely occur if the parties are as-
sured of the confidentiality of the information at trial"). On the application of the same goal to other
privileges see, for example. GE Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119. 1129 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating
that "Iclommunications by parties and witnesses are protected to promote the development and free
exchange of information and to foster judicial and extra-judicial resolution of disputes"); HPD Labs.,
Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting, regarding the attomey-client privilege,
that "Itihe law safeguards these communications to promote the full and free exchange of information
and, in doing so, serves important public interests," yet recognizing the trade-off and stating that "be-
cause it restricts the availability of evidence, the privilege simultaneously obstructs the 'truth-finding
process"'); EEOC v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 145 F.R.D. 74, 75 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that the goal of
government's deliberative process privilege is "to protect the full and free exchange of information in the
agency").
12. Our analysis of information exchange among competitors is relevant for privileges and other
discovery rules aimed at facilitating free exchange of information among current or prospective rival
litigants. Rules facilitating information exchange among persons who are neither rivals nor potential
rivals (e.g., most attorney-client and physician-patient privileges) are not directly affected by our analy-
sis.
13. For the present purposes, we use the terms "impediments" and "'barriers" interchangeably with-
out making a distinction between them.
14. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 553, 559 (1999) ("IFIree-riding reduces the incentives for investment in generating
new information, and without government intervention information tends to be undersupplied.").
15. See Jacques Cremer et al., Contectivity in the Coninercial hiternet, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 433
[Vol. 55:2:231
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assumption that information is a non-rivalrous good, and thus points out that
sharing information entails, besides the costs of collecting and disseminat-
ing information, the cost of losing a competitive edge over rivals that bene-
fit from the information.
In Parts IV and V, the Article explores a number of robust behavioral
phenomena 16 that impede rivals' ability to exploit circumstances where lim-
ited cooperation by way of information exchange becomes profitable. 7 Part
IV focuses on the judgment stage-where market participants must deter-
mine the likely outcomes of the alternative courses of action available to
them-showing how established rivalry norms18 inhibit competitors' ability
to identify profitable cooperation opportunities and how managers' risk
attitudes' 9 may lead them to underestimate the benefits of information shar-
ing arrangements. Part V follows by exploring likely patterns of competi-
tors' choices-revealing that their preference for maintaining the status
quo 0 and aversion to comparative ambiguity 21 may lead competitors con-
sciously to forego profitable, though risky, information sharing arrange-
ments.
Finally, Parts VI and VII conclude the analysis, drawing together the
economic and behavioral findings of this Article. Part VI identifies the cir-
cumstances where the various economic and behavioral impediments to
socially beneficial information sharing are likely to exert their most signifi-
cant effect, as well as the interaction between different impediments. Part
VII concludes by considering those strategies and means, private and pub-
lic, that may be effective in overcoming these impediments. In doing so, this
Part lays a foundation for future research and effective legal policy in im-
portant areas of antitrust law, network industries, critical infrastructures, and
procedural law.
(2000) (introducing the concept of degradation).
16. See generall Christine Jolls et al.. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998) (offering a broad vision of how law and economics could be improved by increasing
its attention to insights about actual human behavior); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics. 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051 (2000) (examining the role of the rational actor in law and economics and discussing the implica-
tions of its replacement by a behaviorally informed actor).
17. For some recent applications of behavioral insights to the analysis of market behavior in anti-
trust law and economics, see Avishalom Tor. The Fable of Entrv: Bounded Rationality. Market Disci-
pline, and Legal Polic '. 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002) Ihereinafter The Fable ofEntnl; Avishalon Tor.
Developing a Behavioral Approach to Antitrust Law and Economics: The Need. the Promise, and Some
Limitations (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript. Harvard Law School, on file with author) 1hereinafter
Developing a Behavior Approach I.
18. See, e.g.. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout. Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735. 1773 (2001) (discussing the need to choose be-
tween norms of cooperation and competition).
19. See, e.g., ZUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE (1995) (providing a large-
scale study of managerial risk attitudes and relating its findings to the broader behavioral literature).
20. See, e.g.. Daniel Kahneman et al.. The Entdowment Effect. Loss Aversion, atmd the Status Quo
Bias. 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991 ).
21. See generallv Colin F. Camerer & Martin Weber. Recent Developments in Modeling Prefer-
ences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325 (1992) (providing a comprehensive
review of the literature).
2004]
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II. THE ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING IN THE EXTANT
LITERATURE
Information sharing is among the most common forms of cooperation
among firms. In some cases, it is a business necessity. For instance, where
several trains use the same track, several power generators use the same
electricity grid, or several firms utilize the same computer network, these
firms cannot function without exchanging information about the use that
one firm makes of the common facility or of the interfacing between the
facility and another firm. In other cases, the exchange of information is a
helpful, but not essential, means to economize the costs of producing mutu-
ally beneficial goods. To illustrate, firms may exchange information that is
useful for business decisionmaking, so that each firm can specialize in ac-
quiring the information that it is most efficient in discovering (e.g., informa-
tion about the firm itself, information on a segment of the market in which
other firms do not participate, etc.).
However, information exchange also has a dark side. Under certain
market conditions, it can facilitate anti-competitive collusion or unilateral
oligopolistic behavior. For example, airlines have allegedly used a common
computer reservation system to signal to each other favorable terms for car-
tels, and to warn each other which prices were deemed by rivals as overly
competitive.22
Due to the potential anti-competitive effect of information sharing, anti-
trust law frequently analyzes the likelihood that information sharing will
facilitate collusion. The economic framework underlying this analysis
determines, for each form of information sharing considered, a firm's mar-
ginal private cost in participating in the information exchange 24 and the
marginal private benefit derived from it.25 Antitrust law expects a firm to
participate in an information sharing plan where participation's marginal
private benefit exceeds the marginal private cost.
26
22. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,687 (D.D.C.
1994) (Competitive Impact Statement), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4700/4797.pdf
(discussing antitrust charges brought by the Department of Justice alleging collusion between airlines
facilitated by coded signals in information provided by the airlines to a computer reservation system).
23. See JV Guidelines, supra note 4. For a discussion of the types of information exchanges that
may facilitate collusion, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACrICE 171-72 (1994).
24. This private cost includes, inter alia, the costs of conveying the information, of assessing re-
ceived information in order to achieve the goal of the information sharing, and of maintaining a mecha-
nism to ensure reciprocity of information exchange (if reciprocity is important to the given scheme).
25. "Private" costs and benefits differ from social costs and benefits in that they do not take into
account externalities, whether positive or negative. For example, a cartel that raises prices and restricts
output enhances the welfare of cartel members, but decreases the welfare of upstream and downstream
firms. "Private" benefits to the cartel members from an information exchange that facilitates the cartel
will not take into account the harm to other firms, but only the benefits to the cartel members. Thus,
when deciding whether to share information, cartel members do not take into account the harm that this
arrangement may cause suppliers and customers.
26. The assessment of both the costs and the benefits depends not only on the specific information
sharing scheme that is assessed, but also on the environment (i.e., market conditions) in which it takes
236 [Vol. 55:2:231
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The extant literature considers information a non-rivalrous good, the use
of which by one party does not increase other parties' costs of using the
same information.27 This perceived quality suggests that information would
be frequently shared, since in an environment in which information is com-
petitively acquired,28 the price that a producer of information would charge
would not exceed much of the marginal cost of producing this informa-
tion.29 If information is non-rivalrous, copying information takes nothingS 30
away from the utility of the original information, so the marginal cost is
only the cost of disseminating the information to an additional "purchaser."
Typically, this cost is not very high compared to the value of the informa-
tion (and this cost seems to be declining with the development of new
methods of information dissemination, such as the Internet).
As stated above, in assessing the likelihood of information sharing, anti-
trust law balances the costs of information sharing with its expected bene-
fits. 31 The presumption of non-rivalrous consumption of information leads
to assuming a low cost to information sharing, while on the private benefits
side antitrust law distinguishes efficient (and hence competitive) from anti-
competitive benefits.32 Some scholars have argued that antitrust law is ex-
place. See, e.g., Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 266 (1996)
(examining the conditions conducive to or adverse to horizontal collusion (including information shar-
ing)).
27. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91
CAL. L. REV. 521, 536 (2003) ("It is possible to imagine physical bandwidth or server capacity being
overconsumed .... But it is not possible to imagine overconsumption of a nonrivalrous thing like
data."); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003) ("In intellectual property, of course, we deal in intangi-
ble, nonrivalrous goods .... [Miost [commentators] agree that information is inherently a public good,
and thus some level of incentives (or other regulatory impetus) is required to ensure an adequate level of
production." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1001 n.20 (explaining that "[plublic goods are those where the
cost of providing the good does not increase with consumption, and where it is generally infeasible to
exclude others from consuming the good"). On non-rivalrousness and public goods generally, see Per-
Olof Bjuggren & Henrik af Donner, Ownership of a Cultural Landmark: The Case of Gotha Canal, 21
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 499, 504-05 (2002); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatiza-
tion and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1433 (2003).
28. An environment in which information is competitively acquired is one in which an idea or its
perfect substitute can be obtained from many different sources. This may happen, for example, when
intellectual property rights do not exist or are not enforced to prevent persons possessing a copy of the
information from making an additional copy and selling it to others, in competition with the original
producer of the information. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (discussing a
similar situation that occurs in some online file sharing networks, such as Napster or Gnutella, where the
copying of music and video files on the Internet incurs a price very close to zero, so most often such files
are not sold but provided freely).
29. See, e.g., Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1151 n.16 (2d Cir.1981) ("In economic terms,
price equals marginal cost in competitive equilibrium."), referencing W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY (2d ed. 1978).
30. And where there is a network effect to the information, for example, where popularity of the
information enhances its value, distributing to others copies of the information would increase the utility
from the original information. See Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software Piracy., U.
Toronto L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-01, 2003, available at
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid =386141.
31. See supra note 26.
32. Cf JV Guidelines, supra note 4, at section 2.1 (discussing potential pro-competitive benefits of
collaborations among competitors); id. at section 2.2 (discussing potential anti-competitive harms from
20041
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cessively suspicious of the motives behind firms' activities, too quick to
find malevolent ends in what may be more plausibly perceived as an effi-
ciency-enhancing collaboration. 33 But even if antitrust law does not exag-
gerate the anti-competitive benefit of information sharing, it would not re-
quire a significant benefit to exceed the typically low marginal cost of dis-
seminating the information to an additional firm (assuming the consumption
of information is non-rivalrous). Therefore, firms would be expected to
share information quite frequently.
The literature does recognize an exception under which information will
not be shared, despite the benefits from sharing exceeding the costs-the
positive externality, or "free rider" problem.34 The free rider problem and
the solution anticipated in the literature stem from the characterization of
information as non-exclusive but excludable. 35 This means that once infor-
mation is produced or acquired, it may be shared and put to use by others at
little additional cost, but it may also be hoarded and not shared.
The first trait-non-exclusivity--causes an externality in the production
of information: information may potentially benefit many, but the benefits
which the producer takes into account are only her own. Therefore, she
would not likely put the same effort into producing information (and there-
fore less information will be produced) as she would have done if the bene-
fit to all who could use the information were taken into account.36 In an
environment in which information is shared or competitively offered for
sale, each person may shirk from uncovering new information, hoping that
someone else will discover the information and then share it (allowing the
shirker a "free ride"). 37 Since everyone follows the same logic, some so-
cially beneficial information sharing is lost.
collaborations among competitors).
33. See Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, Networks, Anarcho-Capitalism, and the Paradox of
Cooperation, REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. (forthcoming), available at
http://www.gmu.eduldepartments/economicslbcaplan/network2.doc (arguing that since cartel formation
and maintenance are not self-enforcing while the provision of public goods may be-that is, if the bene-
fits are internalized---one may believe that private firms can collaborate to provide public goods, yet be
skeptical about the sustainability of collusion among them); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Anti-
trust, 63 TEX. L. REV. I, 1-14 (1984) (criticizing antitrust law for excessively attributing anti-
competitive goals to business behavior that could more plausibly be explained by a non-collusive justifi-
cation).
34. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14, at 559. But see Yochai Benkler, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 438-39 (2002) (arguing that free
riding may not thwart production of a public good in a commons environment, if the free riders merely
shirk and do not harm production, the benefit from the public good to the non-shirkers is sufficiently
high and they believe there is a sufficient number of non-shirkers to produce the public good).
35. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14, at 559.
36. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960) (introducing the
concept of externalities).
37. Even where information is not provided for free, it is often cheaper to pay the competitive
market price (i.e., marginal cost) rather than rediscover the information. This is due to the fact that
producing information tends to incur high fixed costs, which are associated with discovering the infor-
mation, while the marginal cost (which, assuming a non-rivalrous use of the information consists primar-
ily of the cost of disseminating the information to the marginal party) tends to be much smaller.
238 [Vol. 55:2:231
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In the second trait--excludability-lies a solution to the problem cre-
ated by the first. Since information can be excludable (e.g., the producer of
information can withhold it from others or assert intellectual property
rights),38 she may be able to transact with other producers and receive com-
pensation from them that would make it worthwhile for her to produce more
information (but only as much as is warranted by the compensation she can
bargain from the other users). This mechanism is imperfect, because there
are transaction costs both to maintaining excludability (e.g., costs of keep-
ing the information secret or releasing it selectively), and to negotiating a
deal to share the information (e.g., the more potential users of the informa-
tion, the more deals need to be struck to internalize all the externalities; the
combined cost of many deals may be significant).
The imperfection in the ability to internalize externalities involved in
producing and distributing information (and other non-exclusive goods) has
resulted in a wide array of institutions that aim to improve internalization,
including the firm,39 vertical integration,40 and private legal systems.4' Such
institutions internalize the externality typically by monitoring and enforcing
investment in collecting and disclosing information or by allowing selective
disclosure of information only to those who share in the costs of producing
the information.
Above we described in a nutshell the framework used by antitrust law
and other scholarship on the economics of cooperation. We believe this
framework ignores some issues and as a result, the framework's predictions
of the likelihood of exchanging information are often overstated.42 In the
following Parts we examine these issues, some of which involve dynamic
effects of the information exchange that a rational firm would take into ac-
count, while others involve commonplace deviations from strictly rational
behavior.
38. Cf. Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14, at 559 ("[Tlhe use of information cannot be effi-
ciently excluded. This is because information has no physical boundaries, and its duplication and distri-
bution involve relatively low costs. The marginal costs of exclusion are often greater than the marginal
costs of provision, so it is inefficient to spend resources to exclude nonpayers." (footnote omitted)). But
conceding that through intellectual property entitlements, exclusion becomes economically feasible.
39. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining that busi-
ness is conducted in firms when operations within a firm incur fewer transaction costs than incurred by
similar operations through market transactions).
40. See Benjamin R. Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond hdusr',, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the production and dissemination
among diamond traders of information as to traders' honesty and trustworthiness); Avner Greif, Contract
Enforceability and Economic histitutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 525 (1993) (discussing the production and dissemination of information on the honesty of
merchants' agents).




III. THE PROBLEM OF DEGRADATION
A. The Rivalrous Characteristic of Information
The axiom that sharing information among competitors (or, for that
matter, other forms of cooperation among competitors) is non-rivalrous is a
gross oversimplification. An analytical framework that fails to take into
account the private cost to a firm of allowing its competitor to benefit from
an information exchange, as does the prevalent framework, will overesti-
mate the likelihood of information sharing.
Intuitively, yet contrary to the assumption commonly made in the litera-
ture, 43 the "consumption" of information by competing firms often has sig-
nificant rivalrous characteristics. Exclusive possession of useful information
provides a firm with a competitive advantage44 over its rivals (or reduces
rivals' competitive advantage against the firm).45 Seen in reverse, sharing
such information with rivals enhances their competitive position vis-A-vis
the firm possessing the information. This is a cost that is considered by the
firm in deciding whether to share information with rivals and reduces the
firm's private incentives to engage in information sharing.46
For example, Acme Corporation ("Acme") is contemplating sharing in-
formation on cost saving techniques employed in the production process of
widgets with its rival, Adversary Incorporated ("Adversary"). Acme realizes
that by reducing its production costs, Adversary would be able to offer wid-
gets at prices more competitive with Acme's, thereby causing Acme to lose
revenue, either by being forced to reduce the prices of its widgets or by los-
ing some of its sales to Adversary. This does not mean that Adversary can-
not offer Acme a price that would compensate it for the lost revenue. But
the fact that sharing information with Adversary would result in lost reve-
nue to Acme will increase the price Acme would demand for sharing the
information above that which Acme would have demanded if the use of
information were non-rivalrous (i.e., if sharing the information with Adver-
sary would not reduce Acme's profits). 47 Therefore, the increased price de-
43. See, e.g.. Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14, at 559.
44. "Competitive advantage" means that the firm's goods or services are less costly to produce or
more valuable to customers than those of rivals lacking this information.
45. An exception to this rule exists in those cases where the information is only useful to facilitate
collusion. In such cases, the firm benefits from sharing information with others.
46. Society's welfare is not necessarily enhanced by the private benefit a firm achieves from gaining
a competitive advantage over a rival. One firm's gain is another firm's loss. Nonetheless, society's
welfare may be affected by the efficiencies that bring about the competitive advantage, or by the effect
of the competitive advantage on competition. The individual firm, however, considers its private costs
and benefits, and therefore will treat the loss of competitive advantage due to information sharing as a
cost, regardless of the effect (or lack thereof) on society's welfare.
47. The price Adversary would be willing to offer Acme for the information would depend, among
other things, on who else would receive the information. The fewer people who know of the cost-cutting
technique, the more significant the benefit to the few that do know of it. Thus, Adversary may offer a
certain price conditioned on Acme not selling others the same information. Exclusivity might not be
Acme's best bet, though. The more firms use the cost-saving technique, the more pressure mounts on the
remaining firms to also acquire that knowledge; firms without the cost-saving knowledge would lose
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manded for the information most likely results in fewer information ex-
changes. Thus, a model ignoring the rivalrous quality of information may
overstate the likelihood of information sharing.
However, if a transfer of information is reciprocal, firms would seem to
have the correct incentive to share information, even if the consumption of
information is rivalrous. If sharing information with a rival yields a net so-
cial benefit (that is, the use of the information by the rival results in some
benefit other than or in addition to an improved competitive position vis-A-
vis the informant), then the firms' reciprocal commitment to share informa-
tion with each other would allow each of them to realize the efficiencies of
using this shared information while the competitive advantage from this
information, gained by each firm against its rival, would be offset by a simi-
lar gain by the rival.
Modifying the example above, suppose that both Acme and Adversary
have knowledge of (different and cumulative) improvements to the widget
production process and they agree to exchange information. Assuming both
improvements provide similar competitive advantages, an exchange would
result in both companies increasing their competitive advantage over other
firms yet remaining in the same competitive position with respect to each
other (since receiving the other firm's cost-cutting secret offsets the loss of
the advantage provided by divulging their own cost-cutting secret). Thus,
only the costs of conveying the information would be compared to the bene-
fits of the information exchange (the enhanced advantage over third party
rivals), as the extant literature commonly assumes.48
Nevertheless, situations such as the one previously described-where
the exchange of information occurs as soon as the benefits of the exchange
exceed its costs-are most likely uncommon because they require the ful-
fillment of two underlying conditions. First, there must be a mechanism to
ensure that both parties comply with the agreement to exchange informa-
tion. Second, all parties to the information exchange have information that
is of approximately similar utility and that each party's information will
provide similar competitive advantages (so that none of the partners to the
information exchange gains a net competitive advantage over other partners
as a result of the exchange).
Under the first condition, there must be a mechanism to ensure that both
parties comply with the agreement to exchange information. If the informa-
tion exchange is a simultaneous, one-time event, then compliance may not
be difficult. But useful commercial information can rarely be exchanged so
revenue to rivals with lower production costs. Conveying the information to one firm, therefore, results
in a negative externality to all other firms, and this negative externality induces firms to race to acquire
the information lest they be disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of the market. Cf Oriana Bandiera,
Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theor, and Evidence, 19
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 218, 219 (2003) (making a similar argument regarding the purchase of "protection"
from the Sicilian Mafia, where the negative externality is the diversion of crime from protected proper-
ties to those not protected by the Mafia).
48. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 14.
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simply. The exchange often necessitates extensive training and, in other
instances, the timetables for transferring different types of information do
not overlap so the exchange would not be simultaneous. In other instances,
the nature of the information exchange requires not a singular event but a
continuous relationship that leaves either party vulnerable to the other
party's opportunistic breach of the agreement. When the exchange cannot
occur simultaneously, some institution, whether public (like the judicial
system) or private (reputation bonds, collateral, etc.), must police the ex-
change. Such institutions are often in place and typically mitigate the free
riding problem. However, sometimes the institutions are unavailable or lim-
ited in their effectiveness.
49
The second condition for the exchange of information, the requirement
that all parties to the information exchange have information that is of ap-
proximately similar utility and will provide similar competitive advantages,
is even less frequently fulfilled than the first. In most cases, firms differ in
the value that they derive from certain information. Using our earlier exam-
ple, assume that Acme and Adversary have equal costs initially but that
Acme's innovation reduced the cost of producing a widget by 10%, while
Adversary's innovation (which is different and cumulative) will reduce
costs by 7%. Through the information exchange, Acme will be able to re-
duce its widget production costs by an additional 7%, but Adversary will be
able to reduce its production costs by an additional 10%. As a result, Adver-
sary would be able to gain a competitive advantage over Acme (perhaps
reducing its prices by 10% and forcing Acme to either do the same and cut
3% off its gross margin, or risk losing sales to Adversary). Acme still reaps
a 7% cost reduction, which can make it more competitive against all rivals
but Adversary. But if the revenue increase due to those benefits is smaller
than the revenue loss to Adversary (plus the costs of exchanging the infor-
mation and policing the exchange agreement), Acme will decline to ex-
change information.
This form of strategic behavior-taking actions that inflict a greater
harm on one's rivals than inflicted on oneself, and thus seizing competitive
advantages over the rival-is known in the antitrust literature as "raising
rivals' costs." 50 When this action takes the form of refusing cooperation or
compatibility (in our case, declining to share information), we call it "deg-
radation."' ' In the rest of this section, we will discuss the strategy behind
49. See Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks. BYU L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at
14-15. on file with author). Given the complexity of some information exchanges and the informational
advantage of the transferor over the transferee and third parties, an outside institution may have diffi-
culty detecting more subtle violations of an information exchange agreement. Thus, even when an insti-
tution exists to enforce reciprocal information exchanges, the effectiveness of that institution might be
limited.
50. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. No. 2,
at 267, 267 (1983).
51. In network environments, where the term first formed, degradation is a predatory act that weak-
ens the network, harming smaller firms more than larger ones, and therefore giving the larger firms an
advantage over smaller competitors. See Aviram, supra note 49 (manuscript at 25).
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information exchange and related analytical literature. Degradation is par-
ticularly significant in network environments, where cooperation and com-
patibility are essential to realizing network benefits. Therefore, we will em-
phasize the particular manifestations of degradation in network environ-
ments.
B. Degradation (With an Emphasis on Network Environments)
The notion that a competitive advantage can be attained not only
through a "positive" effort of improving one's goods or services but also
through a "negative" effort of harming the goods or services of one's rivals
(through increasing cost or reducing quality), 52 is quite intuitive. Such cas-
ual relationships are found not only in the realm of inter-firm commercial
competition, but also in interpersonal relationships and intra-firm competi-
tion-such as that between employees over promotions and status within
the workplace.53 Only very recently, however, was a model of competition
among employees known as a "promotion tournament" modified to take
into account employees' negative efforts (e.g., sabotage) against their co-
54workers.
Negative efforts have been recognized in the antitrust scholarship,
where they are called predatory practices. Predation has long been a matter
of concern for antitrust law.56 Historically, many firms attempted to gain a
competitive advantage or eliminate competition altogether through indus-
trial espionage, bribery, extortion, and outright harm to their rivals.57 In the
congressional debates over the Federal Trade Commission Act, for instance,
Senator Newlands stated that the National Cash Register Company in fact
"had men in the employ of their rivals, that they had every form of espio-
nage and detection, and that they even resorted to bribery of the employees
of the rival concerns." 58
Outside of these extreme (and generally rare) forms of predation, how-
ever, the anti-competitive motive is more difficult to ascertain and the be-
havior becomes easier to disguise. 59 Antitrust did not develop a theory of
52. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 134 (Free
Press 1993) (1978).
53. For an example of concerns regarding intra-firm competition among employees resulting in
some employees harming their colleagues to advance themselves, see Amy Joyce, Your Colleagues or
Competitors?. WASH. POST, June 8. 2003, at F6.
54. Kong-Pin Chen, Sabotage in Promotion Touttaments, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (2003).
55. BORK. supra note 52, at 144.
56. See id. at 144-48.
57. See, e.g., Steven L. Salop & Lawrence J. White. Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litiga-
tion. 74 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1986).
58. 51 CONG. REC. 11.108 (daily ed. June 25, 1914). For one account of the legislative history of
the FTC Act, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers Os the Original and Prinar Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency hiterpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999).
59. See BORK. supra note 52, at 160. Ascertaining the motives behind firms' strategies is challeng-
ing not only when these acts are predatory. but also when they are collusive. For example. parallel be-
havior of competitors (e.g.. similar pricing) is often expected to be the result of collusion. Yet in some
cases, such behavior may be the result of intense competition that drives all firms' prices down to their
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non-price predation until Salop and Scheffman's paper, 6° which shed light
on the concept of negative effort by introducing the strategy of "raising ri-
vals' costs.",6 1 While this concept has been advanced in later scholarship and
adopted by the enforcement agencies,62 its importance grew dramatically
with the emergence to prominence of network industries.
Network environments are business sectors in which network effects
significantly impact business dynamics. 63 Network effects occur where the
value of consuming a good increases the more others consume that good.
64
Internet marketplaces exemplify this behavior (e.g., eBay).65 If we want to
sell an item, the probability that we will find a potential buyer increases as
more people use the same Internet marketplace. 66 And as buyers, the prob-
ability that we find a person wishing to sell the very item we seek increases
as more people use the marketplace.67 One can think of network effects as
the inverse of congestion-in a congested highway, my utility from the
highway declines with each additional car using the same highway. To
some extent, this may be true for Internet marketplaces as well-possibly, a
high volume of usage slows down the operation of the marketplace. Yet the
network effect is the more dominant of these two effects, at least up to a
certain level of usage. Marketplaces offering a large number of participants
are usually seen as superior to their smaller counterparts, even if they are a
little slower than the latter.
Since network effects are a function of the joint usage of a network,68
maintaining compatibility between network members is crucial for the reali-
zation of network effects. The harm from thwarting the network is not
evenly distributed, however: the larger the individual firm, the lower the
relative benefit gained from becoming part of a larger network. For exam-
(similar) marginal costs. Furthermore, a frictionless cartel would result in less parallel behavior than that
of either firms in perfect competition or finns in a non-collusive oligopoly. See, e.g.. James L. Smith,
Distinguishable Patterns of Competition, Collusion and Parallel Action, MIT Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2003-006, May 16 2003,
http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-41032 1.
60. Salop & Scheffman, supra note 50.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Terry Calvani, Non-Price Predation: A New Antitrust Horizon, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 409
(1985).
63. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 36 ("[A] defining characteristic of network industries, in the sense we are
using the term here, is that increasing returns [in consumption-i.e., network effects] are important
enough to be a fundamental determinant of industry structure and market behavior.").
64. See Aviram, supra note 49 (manuscript at 10-Il ); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Erternalities, Competition and Compatibilio,, 75 AM. ECON. REV. No. 3, at 424,424 (1985) (describing
the network effects phenomenon as one in which "the utility that a user derives from consumption of the
good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good").
65. See Cremer et al., supra note 15.
66. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 64.
67. See id.
68. Networks are institutions that facilitate interconnection between users of a good or service
exhibiting network effects, and thus enable the realization of network effects. See Amitai Aviram, The
Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming
2004) (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
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pie, suppose two telephone companies compete in a market. Firm A has
10,000 subscribers, while Firm B has only 10. If both firms make their sys-
tems compatible and interconnect them, Firm A will be able to offer its sub-
scribers 10 more people to call (an increase of 0.1%), while Firm B will be
able to offer its subscribers 10,000 more people to call (an increase of
100,000%). Naturally, Firm B is likely to be much more eager to intercon-
nect. Firm A, on the other hand, may find that interconnection would place
Firm B on equal footing to it in competing for customers, harming the inter-
ests of Firm A far beyond the benefit to be gained from a 0.1% expansion of
the network.
Thus, firms may have incentives to refuse to become compatible-or, if
already compatible, to refuse to interact, such as to exchange information-
even when compatibility (or information exchange) would increase social
welfare. This phenomena was noted some time ago by scholars in the field
of industrial organization. 69 Farell and Saloner observed that in deciding
whether to make two technologies compatible when one technology is sup-
plied by a single firm, that firm may have an incentive to make conversion
costly.70 Cremer, Rey, and Tirole expanded on this insight, terming this
increase in the cost of compatibility (or a reduction in its quality) "degrada-
tion.,,7 Degradation has been observed (or at least alleged), inter alia, in the
credit card industry,72 the Internet backbone industry,73 and the telephone
industry.74
As the phone companies example above made clear, in networks con-
taining both larger and smaller firms, the larger firms may gain from weak-
ening the network and competing with the smaller members in conditions
closer to those that would exist in the absence of a network.75 These larger
69. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Inter-
faces, 40 J. INDuS. EcON. 9, 26-28 (1992).
70. Id.
71. Cremer et al., supra note 15.
72. See Amitai Aviram, Accommodating a New Tenant in the House of Cards: Introducing Compe-
tition into a Network Industry (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript at 30-3 1, on file with author).
73. Cremer et al., supra note 15.
74. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that cus-
tomers of the incumbent telephone company ("incumbent") allege, among other things, that incumbent
"has failed to provide interconnection between its network and those of competitors that is equal to the
interconnections it gives itself," that incumbent's competitors "have experienced undue delays (pre-
sumably caused by [incumbent]) in acquiring unbundled elements, and those delays have precluded them
from offering services as attractive as [incumbent's]," and that incumbent "has continued to bill custom-
ers of competitors who have converted from -[incumbent's] services, and hence some customers are
being double-billed, thereby harming the competitors' good will"); Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va.,
Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612-16 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing that an entrant phone company alleging,
inter alia, that incumbent mis-routed its calls, provided inferior databases and web-based interfaces for
ordering loops or last-mile facilities, made the process of ordering last-mile facilities (which it con-
trolled) "lengthy, complex, and expensive," and intentionally made the billing process for loops costly
for its competitors).
75. In most cases, the degrading firm is limited to depriving the other network members of the
marginal network benefits attributable to the transactions contributed by the degrading firm. Only in rare
cases could a degrading firm deprive other network members from network effects they confer on each
other. In all other cases, victims of degradation still benefit from network effects created collectively by
them. Therefore, unless the degrading firm is the only significant participant in the network, degradation
20041
Alabama Law Review
firms can do so by excluding others from their network (e.g., refusing to
exchange information with rivals) or by reducing connectivity with other
members of the network (such as by exchanging less information with the
smaller rivals). 76
Degradation does not necessarily amount to complete disconnection
from a network.77 But degradation through lower interconnection quality (or
through existing but imperfect compatibility) is much harder to detect and
much more prevalent. 78 The following hypothetical illustrates such a strat-
egy:79 Goliath Corporation ("Goliath") is a telephone company with a 70%
market share. Goliath makes modifications to the facilities connecting it
with other telephone companies, so that any call between a customer of Go-
liath and a customer of a competing company suffers from static noise.
Calls in which both parties are Goliath customers, and calls not involving
Goliath customers, are not impacted. Betty is a customer of David Incorpo-
rated ("David"), a small competitor of Goliath. Approximately 70% of the
people she calls are Goliath customers (correlating with Goliath's market
share). This means that if she remains a customer of David, 70% of her calls
will suffer from static noise. If she switches from David to Goliath, static
noise will impact only 30% of her calls (those to non-Goliath customers).
Therefore, all else being equal, Betty is likely to switch to Goliath. This is
precisely the reason Goliath adopted a strategy of degradation, though the
quality of its service suffers from the degradation (as 30% of the calls are of
lower quality than before), it hurts the quality of the competitors' services
much more (70% of their calls are affected, in our example). The migration
of customers to the larger network more than compensates the larger com-
pany for the loss resulting from the reduced quality of its own degraded
service.
In the case of the telephone signals' interconnection, degradation ap-
pears as a reduction in the quality signal (i.e., static noise). Similarly, when
the interconnection between companies takes the form of information ex-
changes (e.g., interconnection between credit card companies, which con-
sists of information on transactions between a cardholder of one company
and a merchant working with the other company), degradation appears as a
refusal to exchange information, a slower exchange of information, or the
commission of errors in the information that is exchanged.
Degradation makes strategic use of reduction in cooperation or com-
patibility. While this strategy is typically useful for large firms against
smaller rivals, it can also be employed based on other vulnerabilities of rival
firms. For example, Bank A and Bank B are contemplating connecting their
usually will not cause market conditions to be as if there was no network at all.
76. See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147,
152-56 (1999).
77. See Aviram, supra note 49, at 41.
78. See id. at 43 (stating that "the 'correct' degree of connectivity is very difficult to determine").
79. This example is taken from Aviram, supra note 49, at 39-40.
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online banking networks. If they connect, they will offer their clients a
wider array of options, and they will save some costs in maintaining the
network (as compared to maintaining two separate networks); however,
once the networks are connected, breaching one bank's security system
would enable access to the other bank's system as well. The banks' custom-
ers differ in their preferences regarding online banking: Bank A's customers
primarily receive the bank's services online, while Bank B's customers
mostly rely on the bank's "bricks and mortar" branches and do very little of
their business online.
Consequently, Bank A is more vulnerable to hackers. Bank B would not
be willing to invest as much as Bank A in securing the network, since it
would not be harmed as much by a breach in computer security. Further-
more, if the banks are each other's main competitor, Bank B may gain cus-
tomers from Bank A if the online system is breached. Therefore, Bank B
would underinvest in computer security (a form of degradation), and it may
refuse to exchange information and coordinate with Bank A, if the informa-
tion exchange enhances the security of the network. Anticipating Bank B's
behavior, Bank A is less likely to share information (or otherwise cooper-
ate) with Bank B.
We have discussed in this Part some important, yet neglected, aspects of
the cost-benefit analysis that rational firms would undertake when deciding
whether to share information. In reality, however, as the empirical literature
on judgment and choice clearly shows, business decisionmaking does not
strictly follow rational action precepts. 80 Instead, market actors exhibit sys-
tematic deviations from rational actor models, such as those underlying the
extant scholarship on information sharing.81
IV. DETERMINING THE PROSPECTS OF INFORMATION SHARING: JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Unlike the purely economic impediments to information sharing-those
that appear when market participants act in a way that is privately optimal
for them but socially sub-optimal-behavioral impediments can lead real-
world, boundedly rational82 decisionmakers to exhibit levels of information
80. See, e.g., The Fable of Entry', supra note 17, at 503.
81. For a discussion of the applicability of such deviations in market settings and their legal signifi-
cance, see The Fable of Entry, supra note 17, at 560-67.
82. The term "bounded rationality" designates human decision behavior that, while showing sys-
tematic and predictable patterns, does not conform to the normative requirements of strictly rational
decisionmaking. This idea was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon. Herbert A. Simon, A Behav-
ioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955), available at
http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di951739/95p0I00q/0; Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the
Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956) (discussing the concept of bounded ration-
ality to denote the effects of the limitations of human cognition on decisionmaking). For a discussion of
the term "bounded rationality" and further references, see The Fable of Entry, supra note 17, at 484 n.2.
See also J. Bendor, Bounded Rationality, if INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1303, 1303-04 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001); R. Radner,
Bounded and Costly Rationality, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
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sharing that are even privately sub-optimal. This section therefore explores
those behavioral impediments that, at times, impact competitors' judgments
of the attractiveness of information sharing.
A. Uncertainty and the Attractiveness of information Sharing
Before determining whether to engage in information sharing, market
participants need to assess the risks, costs, and benefits of such an arrange-
ment. If, and only if, the assessment reveals the arrangement to have a posi-
tive net present value ("NPV"), rational managers would embark upon it.
83
When considering information sharing, however, competitor managers in-
evitably make their judgments under uncertainty. They can try to assess the
magnitude of the potential benefits to their businesses from information
sharing and the likelihood that such benefits will occur; they can also try to
judge the magnitude and probability of occurrence of those risks and costs
involved in a given information sharing arrangement-such as those result-
ing from free riding or degradation. Nonetheless, these managers' predic-
tions will be uncertain and probabilistic, since they obviously cannot know
the future of the prospective arrangement with certainty.
For perfectly rational, value-maximizing decisionmakers, the uncer-
tainty of the prospects of information sharing would not necessarily be of
concern. After all, while the benefits of information sharing are bound to be
uncertain, so are the costs and risks of this arrangement. 84 If estimated bene-
fits of information sharing must be adjusted downwards-taking into ac-
count the possibility that they will not materialize-so will also be the case
with the costs and risks of the arrangement.85 On balance, therefore, in the
absence of a clear, asymmetrical impact of uncertainty on the two sides of
scale, the diminished expected value of the one side is compensated for by a
86comparable effect on the other side.
To give a simple illustration, assume that Bank A is considering sharing
information with Bank B. After researching the prospects of this arrange-
ment, Bank A's managers estimate the potential benefit to be $1,000,000
and the potential costs to be $600,000. If all these sums were certain, the
value of the arrangement would be $400,000-an exceptionally profitable
proposition. If, on the other hand, both the benefit and the downside risk of
the arrangement (but not the direct costs, for simplicity's sake) were equally
SCIENCES, supra, 1298, 1298-99 (both defining bounded rationality more broadly than Simon's original
formulation).
83. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
15-34 (6th ed. 2000).
84. See, e.g., id. at 221-23.
85. See, e.g., id.
86. A full NPV analysis would also adjust the present value downwards further, taking into account
the risk involved in the prospective arrangement. See, e.g., id. at 15-24, 221-23, 246-75. Consequently,
this risk would reduce the present value of the arrangement beyond the proportionate reduction on both
the benefits and costs sides. A simplified analysis that disregards these further adjustments does not
change the basic findings and will therefore suffice for the present purpose.
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uncertain, say with an 80% probability of occurrence, the expected value
obviously would be lower. Now the expected benefit would amount to
$800,000 (80% * $1,000,000) and the expected costs to $480,000 (80% *
$600,000), with the expected value of the arrangement now being
$320,000.87
This example also highlights a number of important points about deter-
mining value under uncertainty. First, when the benefits and costs of a fi-
nancial proposition are equally uncertain, the financial proposition's ex-
pected value diminishes proportionally. In these circumstances, a proposi-
tion bearing a positive value under certainty will still have a positive, albeit
smaller, expected value under uncertainty.
Second, when the benefits and costs-as will commonly be the case-
are not equally likely, the attractiveness of information sharing under uncer-
tainty will not only differ from that under certainty but may also bear an
opposite sign, such that a seemingly attractive, positive value arrangement
will be unattractive or vice versa. For instance, if, in the example above, the
potential benefit had been only a 50% chance of materializing, while the
potential downside were very likely, with a 90% probability, the originally
profitable arrangement would now be unprofitable-generating an expected
loss of $40,000.88
Third, the frequently asymmetric impact of uncertainty on the future
benefits and costs of information sharing becomes even more significant in
those common cases where the arrangement bears virtually certain, upfront,
direct costs. Such costs, even when seemingly small compared to the ulti-
mate benefits and costs of information sharing, can sometimes transform an
attractive proposition into a financially untenable one. Assume, for instance,
that the arrangement in our original example 89 requires an upfront invest-
ment of $150,000, which is virtually certain. Now, information sharing
would still be profitable under certainty, with a value of $250,000. How-
ever, even with an equal degree of uncertainty as to the ultimate benefits
and costs of the arrangement, the outcome is less clear cut. If the probability
of these benefits and costs were as high as 80%, information sharing would
still be beneficial, with an expected value of $170,000. 90 If, on the other
hand, the probability of the ultimate benefits and costs were only 35%, the
arrangement would already be unprofitable, producing an expected loss of
$10,000. 9'
87. A full NPV analysis would also discount future benefits and costs, taking into account the time
value of money. See, e.g., id. at 40-45. For simplicity, however, the examples here will treat NPV as
expected value ("EV") unless otherwise noted.
88. Since 50% * $1,000,000 - 90% * $600,000 = -$40,000.
89. Assume that Bank A is considering sharing information with Bank B. After researching the
prospects of this arrangement, Bank A's managers estimate the potential benefit to be $1,000,000 and
the potential costs to be $600,000. If all of these sums were certain, the value of the arrangement would
be $400,000.
90. Since 80% * ($1,000,000 - $600,000) - $150,000 = $170,000.
91. Since 35% * ($1,000,000 - $600,000) - $150,000 = -$10,000. Note the effect of up front costs
that are not discounted will be even greater than suggested by the example, since the future benefits and
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Hence, the attractiveness of any given information sharing arrangement
for a profit-maximizing decisionmaker will depend on the balance of bene-
fits and costs under uncertainty. Where, as may often be the case, the bene-
fits of information sharing are more tangible and probable than the costs
resulting from free riding and degradation, a profitable arrangement is more
likely. Where the opposite holds, on the other hand, and the costs of infor-
mation sharing are expected to occur with high probability, such an ar-
rangement in less likely profitable. Moreover, the common need for a virtu-
ally certain, upfront investment of resources in the arrangement further di-
minishes the profitability of information sharing, with the impact of this
factor increasing, as the need for an upfront investment increases and the
probability of the ultimate outcomes decreases.
Nevertheless, there will be many occasions on which a traditional eco-
nomic analysis of information sharing will still conclude that profit-
maximizing market participants will embark on an information sharing ex-
change, even taking into account the effects of uncertainty when examining
the impact of free riding and degradation. In the remainder of this Article
we will show, however, that a number of behavioral factors combine further
to impede information sharing among competitors. Based on the analysis of
these factors, we predict that competitors will often exhibit sub-optimal
levels of information sharing, below those anticipated by models assuming
perfectly rational profit maximization. In other words, our analysis will
show that a greater proportion of benefits to costs often will be required for
information sharing among competitors to occur.9 2
B. Norms of Rivalry: Recognizing the Value of Limited Cooperation
Social norms93 often impact judgments under uncertainty. 94 Norms help
decisionmakers interpret their social environment, giving meaning to am-
costs will be discounted.
92. Other ways to overcome impediments to information sharing are discussed in detail infra.
93. Different definitions of the term "social norms" abound in legal scholarship. E.g., Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656-57 (1996) (defining norms as obligations); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining norms as
"all rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational rules");
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340
(1997) (defining norms as "informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699-1701 (1996) (defining
norms as rules distinguishing desirable and undesirable behaviors while giving a third party the authority
to punish those engaging in behaviors that are undesirable); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms fromn
Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 364 n.24 (2003) (defining norms as
"behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting with each other"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) (using a rough definition of norms
as "social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to
be done").
94. Scholars often observe that norms constrain choices by defining appropriate and inappropriate
behaviors in different circumstances. However, while norms can merely constrain choices without exert-
ing any deeper impact on preferences or judgments, they may also more fundamentally construct those
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biguous behaviors of others and suggesting appropriate reactions to these
behaviors. 95 In fact, by defining accepted modes of conduct and interaction
in different circumstances, social norms can also alert human actors to the
need for a change in behavior. 96 When decisionmakers recognize a suffi-
cient change in circumstances such that an extant norm no longer applies,
they either apply a different norm or make an ad hoc judgment of the situa-
tion at hand.97
For example, when the behavior of others seems to conform to relevant
norms, the actor's own behavior can follow habitual routines without requir-
ing any special attention or thought.98 An apparent violation of accepted
norms on the part of others, on the other hand, is alarming. A violation of
accepted norms signals to the actor a need to reassess the situation and ex-
amine whether behaviors different from those suggested by the current
norm may be more appropriate, whether others have violated a common
norm, or whether a change in the situation merits a change in one's behav-
ior.
In this way, norms help facilitate and stabilize social interaction. They
frequently absolve individuals in society of the need continually to make
judgments of appropriate behaviors, and allow us to direct our limited men-
tal resources to those problems and situations that merit greater attention by
virtue of their being unique, unusual, or simply different. Sometimes, there-
fore, social norms can play an efficiency-promoting role, although they are
unlikely to be efficient per se. 99
At other times, however, even those generally beneficial social norms
will have an efficiency-decreasing effect. This will be the case, for instance,
preferences and impact those judgments that underlie choices. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 93, at 913
("Wle might say that preferences are constructed ... by social situations, in the sense that they are very
much a function of the setting and the prevailing norms." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
95. For one quite rare analysis that relates the function of social norms to their underlying psycho-
logical mechanisms and anchors the discussion in the empirical evidence accumulated by social psy-
chologists, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norns, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
Rachlinski also notes the impact of norms on judgment under uncertainty. Id. at 1547 ("Group norms can
also affect people's perceptions and beliefs."); id. at 1564 ("IPleople actively interpret the social circum-
stances in which they find themselves, making subjective reality as important a determinant of behavior
as objective reality.").
96. Although this shorthand description captures the nature of the problem discussed here, in reality,
of course, multiple norms apply in any given situation, and a change in behavior results from a shift in
the balance of different norms or in a change in the dominating norm. E.g., id. ("Ilin most circum-
stances, multiple social forces push social behavior in opposite directions.").
97. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 95.
98. See, e.g., id.
99. Legal scholars debate whether norms tend to be efficient. E.g., Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and
the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997) (arguing that commercial norms
will be more efficient than rules based on individual analysis and experimentation, but are still unlikely
to be optimal); Posner, supra note 93 (arguing that norms are unlikely to be efficient); Mark J. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARM. L. REV. 641 (1996) (arguing against the effi-
ciency of commercial norms). But see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code's Searchfor hmnanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (arguing the legaliza-
tion of otherwise efficient business norms may undermine that efficiency); Cooter, supra note 93 (argu-
ing that a free business community will have efficient norms in the absence of nonconvexities or spill-
overs to other communities).
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when decisionmakers continue to conform to an obsolete norm even when
the situation will have changed in a way that merits the application of an
altogether different norm (or at least a change in the extant norm). Such an
outcome will be especially likely when the situation has changed in subtle
or ambiguous ways.' °°
But when others continue to conform to a norm that has become inap-
propriate due to changed circumstances, the actor is also less likely to detect
the relevant change. In these settings, therefore, the generally useful stabi-
lizing function of social norms becomes a burden, impeding the adaptation
of people's behavior to changed circumstances. Moreover, even when one
actor determines that a change of norm is due, it is still difficult effectively
to create such a change. One can send a signal by violating the extant norm,
but such a move will often lead to a negative reaction and possibly a social
sanction from others. More likely, the circumstances will have to change in
a sufficiently unambiguous manner so that other actors will also identify the
possible need for a change.
Norms of rivalry among competitors may therefore erect one significant
behavioral barrier to information sharing. 0' Market participants constantly
compete with their rivals for profitability, market share, and market
power. 10 2 Often, the success of one participant comes at the expense of its
rivals. Moreover, competitors must be on guard from strategic behavior on
the part of their rivals.
10 3
Society, of course, encourages intense competition in the market as the
foundation of a healthy, prosperous economy. 04 The competitive model, in
fact, is deeply embedded in our culture, 0 5 and is directly promoted in the
training of business decisionmakers."' 6 The law, especially antitrust law,
100. E.g., Rachlinski, supra note 95, at 1551 (discussing psychological studies showing, inter alia,
that the effect of norms on judgment tends to linger); id. at 1565 (repeating the same conclusion but also
noting that decisionmakers' continuous interpretation of their social environment undermines this ef-
fect); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607 (2000) (characterizing internalized norms that are slow to change in the face of contradic-
tory criminal laws as "sticky").
101. E.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 1773 ("Yet a third possibility is that players look to others'
behavior as a signal in a novel and otherwise ambiguous social situation of what the appropriate norm of
conduct is, and whether the context calls for primarily cooperative or competitive behavior.").
102. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, at xiii-xx (1980).
103. E.g., Salop & Scheffman, supra note 50.
104. See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 18 (3d ed. 1990) (asking "[wlhy is a competitive market system held in such
high esteem" and "[w]hy is competition the ideal in a market economy").
105. For one lucid description, see Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?,
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 193-98 (1965).
106. Competitive strategy is central to current business school education. Harvard Business School,
which is typical in this respect, includes a required course on the topic in the first year M.B.A. curricu-
lum. See Harvard Business School Curriculum,
http:/www.hbs.edu/mba/experience/learncurriculunrequiredcurriculunmterm2.html. Additionally,
Harvard Business School offers a whole unit of elective courses on competition and strategy. See Har-
vard Business School Curriculum, http://www.hbs.edu/mba/admin/acs/index.html. For more information
on this subject, see Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust Stool: What the Business Schools Have
to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 21 (2003).
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sends a clear message to market participants regarding the importance of
free and vigorous competition,10 7 emphasizing the illegality and anti-
competitiveness of cartels and many other horizontal restraints of trade. 0 8
However, while norms of intense rivalry are crucially important to the
economy, they can also, like other efficiency-promoting norms, bring about
inefficient outcomes. This will be the case, for instance, where highly com-
petitive market participants will seek to compete using unfair or illegal
means, sometimes to the detriment of consumers and competition at
large. 109
Our working hypothesis implicitly consisted of the following elements: (I) antitrust is
largely about how business firms behave in their rivalrous inter-relations; (2) firms behave on
the basis of decisions made by individual managers and directors; (3) business schools teach
future managers and directors about the nature and norms of competition; (4) what is thought
and what is taught in the business schools are likely to affect how firms actually compete; and
(5) this information may confirm, supplement, or contradict the ways in which antitrust
analysis is currently handled.
Id. at 21 (introducing a conference titled "What Do Business Schools Teach About Antitrust? "); Norman
W. Hawker, Antitrust Insightsfrom Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67 (2003) (review-
ing the main characteristics of current business school education on competitive strategy).
107. Thus, the Sherman Act has been titled "lain act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies." The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000)). The Supreme Court has pronounced and reiterated this value on numerous occa-
sions. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democ-
ratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Id. at 4.
108. Thus, while the modem view of antitrust is more nuanced, recognizing that some horizontal
restraints are pro-competitive and some vertical ones are anti-competitive, the common understanding
that the former types of restraints tend to be more problematic underlies much of the traditional distinc-
tion between per se illegality and the rule of reason. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d
126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
It is important to distinguish between "horizontal" restraints, i.e. agreements between com-
petitors at the same level of market structure, and "vertical" restraints, i.e. combinations of
persons at different levels of the market structure, such as manufacturers and distributors.
Horizontal restraints alone have been characterized as "naked restraints of trade with no
purpose except stifling competition," and, therefore, per se violations of the Sherman Act. On
the other hand, while vertical restrictions may reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the
number of sellers of a particular product, competing for a given group of buyers, they also
promote interbrand competition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in
the distribution of its products. They are, therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason
standard.
Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Polygram Holding, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 15,453 at 22,453-22,458 (FTC 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/polygramopinion.pdf, slip op. at 13-29 (providing a recent detailed syn-
thesis of the law of horizontal restraints).
109. Aggressively competitive behavior that harms only competitors does not violate the antitrust
laws. For a recent discussion of different definitions of harm to competition and their implications, see
Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionan, Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002). See also BORK, supra note 52, at ix-xiv (summing up the early Chicago
School argument regarding the need to rationalize this concept).
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Importantly, however, rivalry norms can also lead to inefficient out-
comes by inhibiting market participants' abilities to recognize limited op-
portunities for efficient cooperation and impeding the establishment of such
cooperative arrangements. Rivals, who regularly engage in intense competi-
tion, will have difficulty ascertaining under uncertainty when precisely lim-
ited cooperation-such as information sharing-becomes privately benefi-
cial despite their general rivalry.
Consequently, a potentially beneficial cooperative arrangement will
have to promise far greater advantages than the merely positive NPV re-
quired for its establishment according to models of rational profit maximi-
zation.110 Competitors will also find it difficult, moreover, to convey the
mutual desirability of partial cooperation to their counterparts, especially
where the objective economic impediments of free riding and degradation
are present and where some forms of cooperation among competitors are
illegal."' In this way, the "stickiness" of norms can erect a behavioral bar-
rier to information sharing.
C. Managerial Risk Perceptions and the Illusion of Control
When rivals do consider the possibility that they might benefit from in-
formation sharing, they must judge the prospects of such an arrangement.
However, managerial risk perceptions and the illusion of control combine to
make information sharing appear less attractive than an objective, rational
actor based analysis would suggest.
Decisionmakers often deem themselves able to control chance occur-
rences and risky eventualities, especially when final outcomes depend on a
mixture of skill and chance, exhibiting the illusion of control. 12 Managers,
furthermore, appear especially prone to overestimate their ability to control
certain chance events. They do not consider themselves risk takers but
rather "risk controllers," sophisticated actors who only take calculated, con-
trolled risks. Managers believe that "managerial risk taking is an endeavor
where a manager can use his judgment, exert control, and utilize skills.""' 3
110. See supra note 83.
Ill. One psychological phenomenon that may well contribute to this difficulty is "reactive devalua-
tion," whereby adversaries tend to devalue proposals solely because they have been offered by their
counterparts. See Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J.
389, 392 (1991); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 150-60 (1994) (providing a detailed discussion of the
limited evidence on this phenomenon).
112. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975)
(also citing earlier studies); see also David V. Budescu & Meira Bruderman, The Relationship Between
the Illusion of Control and the Desirability Bias, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109, 110 (1995) (citing
additional studies). This illusion stems from people's inability to distinguish between "skill" and
"chance" situations and their more general desire to believe they can control the world around them. It
leads to inflated expectations of personal success in tasks whose outcomes depend, in part or in whole,
upon chance factors. Id. at 109-10; Langer, supra, at 313.
113. See, e.g., SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at 46-49 (1995) (reporting managers' emphasis on control
and skills). Reporting the findings of this in-depth study of managerial perspectives on risk using a
sample of over 700 managers, Shapira notes:
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When they find a potential venture too risky or when they think that they
cannot manage the risks associated with the venture effectively, they are
likely to refrain from embarking on it. 1
4
This tendency makes competitor managers less inclined to expose them-
selves to "uncontrolled" risks, such as ceding control of important informa-
tion regarding their operations to their rivals. This is especially true when
that information could be used strategically to their disadvantage." 15 Infor-
mation sharing will thus appear less attractive, all else being equal, than
maintaining a purely competitive relationship without ceding any control.
Hence, although they usually only have a limited degree of control with
respect to the risks they face in the daily operation of their businesses, man-
agers' belief in their control of these risks, on the one hand, and their aver-
sion to facing seemingly uncontrolled risks, on the other hand, join to di-
minish the attractiveness of partial cooperation with rivals.
The illusion of control has also been shown to diminish managers' sen-
sitivity to probability estimates, leading them to give more weight to the
anticipated value of the "downside" risk of a venture than to the probability
that this risk would materialize. 16 Therefore, competitor managers may be
less inclined to share information in the face of a low probability but poten-
tially harmful downside risk, for example, from the strategic use of degrada-
tion by their rivals.
Insofar as market participants find information sharing "risky" due to
the apparent loss of control involved in information sharing, they are also
likely to underestimate the benefits of such an arrangement and its likeli-
hood of success. Additionally, they are likely to overestimate the costs in-
volved in this sharing. Exhibiting an affect heuristic, that leads to the align-
ment of benefits and costs estimates with risk perceptions regarding various
activities. 117
When judging an activity they consider risky, decisionmakers tend to
believe it is also not beneficial." 8 This belief is nevertheless bound to be
wrong on most occasions since, in reality, risks and benefits are more often
[The managers] believed that risk was manageable. Seventy-three percent of the respondents
saw risk as controllable. As a result, they made a sharp distinction between gambling (where
the odds are exogenously determined and uncontrollable) and risk taking (where skill or in-
formation can reduce the uncertainty). The situations they faced seemed to them to involve
risk taking but not gambling.
Id. at 73 (citing earlier studies reporting managers' perceptions of their ability to control risks in addition
to the above quote).
114. Cf. id. at 74-78.
115. See supra Part III.B.
116. SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at 43-53; see also James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Per-
spectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1411-12 (1987) (describing and discussing
reasons for managerial insensitivity to probability in risk estimates).
117. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 410-13 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing the relevant evi-
dence).
118. See, e.g., Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000).
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positively than negatively correlated with one another." 9 After all, activities
bearing a high risk but a low benefit are unlikely ever to take place, while
highly beneficial activities may be embarked upon, despite the risks in-
volved. 20 This is especially true in the financial domain, where the relation-
ship between risk and return is fundamental to the economic theory of in-
vestment decisionmaking. Nevertheless, there is evidence that even profes-
sional analysts base their risk and return judgments on a global affective
attitude, judging unfamiliar stocks as bearing both low return and high risk
if those stocks were perceived as "bad" and vice versa if they were per-
ceived as "good."1
2'
In fact, recent studies show that, because of the affect heuristic, people's
judgments of the benefits of different activities tend to change when they
learn new information about the risks involved in these activities. 2 For
instance, when learning that a certain source of energy is riskier than they
previously thought it to be, decisionmakers' estimates of the benefits from
using that source diminish, despite being provided with no evidence to that
effect. 123
Finally, the evidence on the illusion of control reveals that some vari-
ables-typically the same factors that people associate with success in skill-
dependent tasks-determine the strength of the illusion. 24 A number of
these variables, however, are likely to lead rival managers to disfavor partial
cooperation by information sharing, as compared to maintaining strictly
competitive relationships. Studies show, for instance, that decisionmakers
think their odds of winning a pure chance gamble are greater when they are
more familiar or skilled with either the stimulus (e.g., the particular lottery
ticket) or the necessary response; when they are actively (versus passively)
involved in the task; and importantly, when competition is present.
25
These variables-namely, familiarity, a more active role, and the pres-
ence of competition--operate more strongly in pure competition among
rivals than in partial cooperation. Rivals are less familiar with the new pros-
pects of information sharing; they are unlikely to be as dominant and active
in the joint cooperative arrangement as they are in their own businesses;
and, most obviously, cooperative information sharing inevitably diminishes
the degree of competition among rivals.
119. See id. at 3.
120. See id. at 3-4 (reviewing studies showing this effect and discussing the objective relationship
between risk and benefit).
121. See Yoav Ganzach, Judging Risk and Return of Financial Assets, 83 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 353 (2000).
122. See Finucane et a]., supra note 118, at 9.
123. Id. at 13.
124. See generally Langer, supra note 112.
125. E.g., id. at 315 (Experiment I, competition), 318 (Experiment 3, stimulus familiarity), 319-20
(Experiment 4, response familiarity), and 320-22 (Experiments 5-6, type of involvement). As Langer
herself notes, moreover, the phenomena revealed by experimental findings using pure chance devices
such as lottery tickets and gambles should operate even more powerfully in real-world settings, where it
is truly difficult to distinguish skill and luck effects. See id. at 324.
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Managers' perceptions of risk, in light of their illusion of control and re-
lated phenomena, may therefore erect an additional impediment to informa-
tion sharing. Thus, even those competitors who overcome the inhibiting
effect of rivalry norms and attempt to judge the prospects of information
sharing are likely to find information sharing less attractive than objectively
warranted. Managers' tendencies to overestimate the prospects of pure
competition over novel partial cooperation therefore make it likely they will
recognize as profitable only those arrangements that bear a significantly
positive-as opposed to marginally profitable NPV.
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF EMBARKING ON AN INFORMATION SHARING
ARRANGEMENT: BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING
Competitors are likely to be slower in recognizing the possibility of
profitable information sharing than traditional economic theories allow be-
cause of the persistence of rivalry norms. They also tend to underestimate
the attractiveness of such partial cooperation compared to remaining in a
purely competitive setting, that seems better controlled. The development of
cooperative information sharing is further likely to be impeded, moreover,
by market participants' preference for maintaining the status quo and avoid-
ing comparatively ambiguous alternatives, unless they recognize a far supe-
rior alternative. Consequently, market participants' mere identification of a
profit-maximizing information sharing arrangement typically will not make
the arrangement a sufficiently attractive opportunity.
A. The Biasing Power of the Status Quo: Loss Aversion and Omission Bias
Loss aversion and the status quo bias are fundamental characteristics of
human decisionmaking.126 The standard economic assumption in financial
decisionmaking is that preferences do not depend on current assets but, in-
stead, on the decisionmaker's overall asset position.127 In other words, when
choosing among different options, it should not matter to rational actors, for
instance, how these options relate to the current state of affairs, but how
these options compare in terms of their NPV.
28
A substantial amount of psychological evidence shows, however, that
reference points play a large role in determining preferences among options.
Specifically, numerous studies show that decisionmakers commonly evalu-
ate their options as gains and losses relative to the status quo.129 They also
find potential losses far more painful than they find comparable potential
126. See, e.g., Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 194.
127. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).
128. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 83, at 93-I 13.




gains beneficial, and show a diminishing sensitivity to both losses and
gains, such that the marginal value of both diminishes with their size.
30
To illustrate, when faced with a hypothetical choice, between A-after
having been given $1000, the participant has a 50% chance of getting an-
other $1000 or otherwise nothing-and B-after having been given $1000,
the participant can get another $500 for sure-a dramatic majority of par-
ticipants choose the latter option.' 3' This choice reflects risk aversion. At
the same time, other participants were told that they have been given $2000
and then had to choose between C-a 50% chance of losing $1000 or oth-
erwise nothing-and D-losing $500 for sure. The latter participants
showed a clear preference for the former, risk-seeking option. 32 Analyti-
cally, however, the option pairs A and C, and B and D, are identical in terms
of total asset position! Thus, if choices were made based on absolute out-
comes rather than reference points, participants should not have exhibited
opposite preferences across the two conditions. 
133
One important implication of loss aversion is that market participants
have a strong tendency to remain in the status quo, because the disadvan-
tages of leaving the status quo loom larger than the advantages of doing
so.'13 Decisionmakers have been shown to exhibit a status quo bias in many
domains including hypothetical choices about jobs, financial investments,
and policy issues. 35 In one real life case, for instance, Harvard employees
exhibited a status quo bias in choosing their medical plans and the alloca-
tion of pension reserves. 36 Reviewing this evidence, the researchers who
originally introduced the term loss aversion noted that models ignoring the
status quo bias "will present excessively radical conclusions, exaggerating
individuals' responses to changing economic variables and predicting
greater instability than is observed in the world."'
137
Thus, rivals exhibiting loss aversion will find the prospect of informa-
tion sharing as compared to a status quo of non-cooperation less attractive
than information sharing is objectively. They will tend to exhibit privately
sub-optimal levels of information sharing, failing to share until the per-
ceived benefits of such a practice appear dramatically greater than the costs.
While loss aversion is pervasive in decisionmaking, moreover, other psy-
chological and economic variables reinforce the status quo bias.
Specifically, some scholars have argued this bias can be explained on
purely rational economic grounds, without reference to psychological evi-
130. See, e.g., id. at 265-67 (introducing a range of findings on risky decisionmaking in violation of
expected utility theory and offering what has become a leading alternative descriptive model).
131. E.g., id. at 273 (Problem II).
132. E.g., id. (Problem 12).
133. See, e.g., id. (Problems I 1-12).
134. See, e.g., Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 194; William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser,
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (introducing the term and
providing a range of findings to support it).
135. Id.
136. E.g., id.
137. Id. at 47.
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dence. 38 Some of these economic variables have limited relevance in the
case of information sharing, applying only in those circumstances where the
costs of analyzing the potential arrangement or the transaction costs in-
volved in consummating information sharing are large when compared with
the anticipated benefits. 139 In these cases, strictly rational and fully informed
decisionmakers will hold to the purely competitive status quo instead of
moving to a more profitable information sharing arrangement, because the
costs associated with the move outweigh the benefits to them.
Another economic factor, however, which may apply to decisionmaking
in somewhat broader circumstances, is asymmetric information.140 In such a
model, the party that is uninformed takes into account the possibility that
the other party has private information about the true value of the options. 141
Hence, insofar as the value of information sharing to the informed party is a
function, in part, of the costs to the uninformed party-such as when the
risk of degradation is present-the uninformed party will rationally incorpo-
rate this possibility by making a downward adjustment in its estimates of
the present value of the arrangement. This phenomenon may also be the
case when both parties know their counterparts possess relevant private
information.
42
In addition to loss aversion, omission bias-that is, decisionmakers'
tendency to react more strongly to actions as compared to inactions that lead
to similar outcomes-may be partly responsible for the status quo bias.
43
After all, under most circumstances, moving away from the status quo also
involves action, while maintaining the status quo does not. Like loss aver-
sion, this variable also operates in circumstances where rational actor mod-
els, including those accounting for the effects of transaction costs and
asymmetric information, would expect information sharing to take place.
Omission bias also resembles loss aversion in being reference dependent.
44
138. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 127.
139. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 134.
140. For one recent attempt to account for some of the phenomena typically associated with loss
aversion on asymmetric information grounds, see Dominique Y. Dupont & Gabriel S. Lee, The Endow-
ment Effect, Status Quo Bias and Loss Aversion: Rational Alternative Explanation, 25 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 87 (2002).
141. Id. at 88.
142. Note, however, that it is doubtful whether real parties are likely properly to take into account
asymmetric information. See, e.g., Avishalom Tor & Max H. Bazerman, Focusing Failures in Competi-
tive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors in the Monty Hall Game, the Acquiring a Company
Problem, and Multi-Party Ultimatums, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 353 (2003) (showing that
decisionmakers make systematic errors in competitive games because they fail to take into account the
impact of information held only by other parties on the decisions likely to be made by these other parties
in light of the rules of the game).
143. See liana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 495 (1994) [hereinafter Reference Points]; Ilana Ritov &
Jonathan Baron, Status Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1992) Ihereinafter
Status Quo].
144. Meaning the impact of omission bias occurs because market participants make their choices by
comparing options to a baseline, commonly the status quo, instead of examining these options' outcomes
in terms of overall asset position. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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A number of studies suggest that people prefer risky omissions to com-
parable risky commissions. 45 For instance, in one study, many participants
preferred not to vaccinate a child when the risk of death was twice as great
from disease (10 in 10,000) as from vaccination (5 in 10,000). 146 Omission
biases have also been shown to occur in hypothetical financial decisions,
where participants find a negative outcome of financial loss worse when it
was the result of an action (e.g., switching stock holdings from one com-
pany to another) than inaction (e.g., not switching the holdings).
47
The stronger affective reaction to the negative outcomes of commis-
sions, as compared to omissions, frequently contributes to the status quo
bias. After all, in most situations-as well as in the case of rivals consider-
ing engaging in information sharing-an omission implies holding to the
status quo. A commission, on the other hand, typically involves moving
away from the status quo to another alternative. On these occasions, deci-
sionmakers will tend to exhibit a status quo bias, because the potentially
negative outcomes of such a move are perceived as more painful than those
of inaction.
B. Aversion to Comparative Ambiguity
Even when competitors determine that a potential information sharing
arrangement bears a positive NPV, they may still further discount its value
in their choices due to comparative ambiguity aversion.148 Ambiguity aver-
sion-namely, decisionmakers' preference for options with more certain
outcome probabilities over options with less certain outcome probabilities
but equal expected values-"is one of the most robust phenomena docu-
mented in the decision making literature."'' 49 Competitors who are averse to
ambiguity, however, will sacrifice value willingly to avoid the less familiar,
145. E.g., lana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Commission Bias and Ambiguity,
3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990); Mark Spranca et al., Omission and Commission in Judgment
and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 76 (1991).
146. Ritov & Baron, supra note 145. There is also real-world evidence for omission bias in gambling,
where inaction is preferred to action in the face of high-probability losses, although the expected value of
the latter is greater than that of the former. Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren, Calibration of
Probability Assessments by Professional Blackjack Dealers, Statistical Experts, and Lay People, 36
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 406 (1985); see also Daniel Kahneman &
Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 (1986)
(discussing these findings and relating them to the emotional asymmetry between action and inaction).
147. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 Sc. AM. 160 (1982);
Status Quo, supra note 143.
148. See Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 41, 44-46 (Robin M. Hogarth &
Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). For an instructive summary of the findings on ambiguity aversion, see
Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in I THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587
(John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). See generally Camerer & Weber, supra note 21 (providing
a comprehensive review of the literature).
149. Gideon Keren & Leonie E. M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of Ambigu-
ity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 149, 149 (1999).
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more ambiguous option of information sharing as compared to maintaining
their current, purely competitive practices.
50
Beginning in the early 1960s, experimental evidence of ambiguity aver-
sion started to amass.' 5' Experimental tests consistently have shown that
participants prefer unambiguous gambles-such as betting on drawing a red
ball from a one hundred-ball urn with fifty red and fifty black balls-over
ambiguous ones (e.g., where the distribution of red and black balls in the
urn was either unknown or within a range of, say, fifteen to eighty-five red
balls). 52 In many other studies, subjects have been found to forego substan-
tial amounts-around ten percent to twenty percent of the expected value of
the bets-to avoid the ambiguous option. 53 And while there is some limited
evidence of ambiguity preference, these findings are limited to betting on
gains with ambiguous low probabilities, or losses with ambiguous high
probabilities. 
154
Ambiguity aversion has also been shown to impact decisionmaking in
experimental auction markets. 55 In these experiments, ambiguous and un-
ambiguous lotteries were auctioned using a number of different auction
forms. 156 The results showed persistent ambiguity aversion around the mid-
dle of the probability range (i.e., fifty percent) but not for very low prob-
abilities (i.e., five percent), 57 with a resulting underestimation by partici-
pants of their likelihood of winning the auction as a result. 58 Other studies
document the likely effects of ambiguity aversion in real-world settings
ranging from the acceptance rates of economics articles by the American
Economic Review, through investors' global preference for home-country
150. In fact, recent studies also suggest that irrespective of their aversion to comparative ambiguity,
decisionmakers also discount the value of information about economic events. See Eric Van Dijk &
Marcel Zeelenberg, The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in Economic Decision Making, 16 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 341 (2003) (showing this effect for ambiguity regarding past sunk costs,
future potential, and future costs).
151. See id. at 150.
152. Selwyn W. Becker & Fred 0. Brownson, What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role of Ambiguity in
Decision-Making, 72 J. POL. ECON. 62 (1964) (discussing this example, which provided the first system-
atic examination of the ambiguity aversion following its famous original introduction by Daniel Ells-
berg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961)).
153. See generally Camerer, supra note 148, at 646.
154. See Barbara E. Kahn & Rakesh K. Sarin, Modeling Ambiguit. in Decisions Under Uncertainy,
15 J. CONSUMER RES. 265 (1988) (suggesting their findings show a reflection effect for gains/loss re-
sembling that found for risk). But see Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, The Center and Range of the
Probability Interval as Factors Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 273 (1985) (finding that ambiguity avoidance increases with an increase in the
center value of the probability interval, but no evidence for systematic ambiguity seeking); Joanna L.Y.
Ho et al., Effects of Outcome and Probabilistic Ambiguit. on Managerial Choices, 24 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 47 (2002) (finding this pattern only where outcomes, but not probabilities, were ambigu-
ous, with the reflection effect in losses under ambiguous probabilities occurring only where the ambigu-
ous and unambiguous probabilities were very close to one another).
155. Rakesh K. Sarin & Martin Weber, Effects of Ambiguity in Market Experiments, 39 MGMT. SCI.
602 (1993).
156. Id. at 603.
157. /d. at 610-11.
158. Ahti A. Salo & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions, I I J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 123 (1995).
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investments at the cost of some foregone diversification, to the pricing deci-
sions of insurance professionals. 59
The notion of competence is one of the leading explanations for the gap
between decisionmakers' probability judgments and their willingness to pay
based on these judgments where ambiguity aversion occurs. 160 In a set of
experiments, Heath and Tversky have shown that participants' preferences
for betting on their ambiguous, real-world knowledge versus betting on a
known chance outcome, depend on whether they feel especially competent
or knowledgeable about the relevant events.'16 For example, participants
who were pre-selected for their knowledge of politics and lack of knowl-
edge of football, preferred to bet on political events rather than on chance
events that they considered equally probable, but showed the opposite pref-
erence for betting on sporting events. 1
62
These findings and further research show that ambiguity aversion vis-A-
vis real-world events is driven by feelings of incompetence. 63 Such feelings
are important when decisionmakers need to compare to one another two or
more events about which they have different levels of knowledge.' 64 Appar-
ently, the contrast between the different levels of knowledge makes the less
familiar bet less attractive under joint evaluation.1
65
Furthermore, the comparative ignorance underlying ambiguity aversion,
according to this account, depends on decisionmakers' subjective state of
mind.' 66 This ignorance is not a function of the objective degree of knowl-
edge possessed by the actor but a function of a reluctance to act on what is
believed to be inferior knowledge. This inferiority can be brought to mind
either by a comparison with one's superior knowledge about other events or
domains or by a comparison with other people who appear more knowl-
edgeable.
167
Unsurprisingly, therefore, context variables that concern the comparison
between the decisionmaker and relevant others affect the degree of ambigu-
ity aversion exhibited by the former. For instance, a recent study found that
people are sensitive to the relative competence of their counterpart when
159. See Camerer, supra note 148, at 649 (reviewing these and related findings).
160. See Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice
Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1991).
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id. at 13-15 (similarly finding a comparable pattern for participants with high knowledge of
football and low knowledge of politics); Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Com-
parative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 587 (1995).
163. Heath & Tversky, supra note 160; Fox & Tversky, supra note 162.
164. Fox & Tversky, supra note 162, at 587.
165. See id. at 585, 587. Decisionmakers may still be ambiguity averse under some circumstances, if
less so, for separately evaluated events. See, e.g., Sarin & Weber, supra note 155 (finding a much higher
discrepancy between clear and vague bets in joint as compared to separate markets).
166. See Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and Decision
Context, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476 (2002), available at
http://www.cebiz.org//cds/fox-weber.pdf.
167. See id. (emphasizing that "comparative ignorance" refers to the decisionmaker's state of mind);
Fox & Tversky, supra note 162, at 587.
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playing a simple competitive game ("matching pennies. However, this same
study also found that people are not sensitive to their relative competence of
their counterpart when playing a noncompetitive game.
68
Taken together, the findings on ambiguity aversion suggest that rivals
may choose to sacrifice a measure of expected value to avoid the ambiguous
course of action of a novel information sharing arrangement. Moreover, the
inevitable comparison between current, familiar practices-with regard to
which they are likely to feel far more competent-and the ambiguous pros-
pects of information sharing is bound to enhance competitors' aversion to
the latter course of action.
Finally, as if the clear contrast between the extant practices and the pro-
spective arrangement were not enough, the fundamentally competitive rela-
tionship between market rivals contributes to another comparison-between
the rivals' relative competences. In the absence of any strategic threat or
asymmetric information, such a comparison might have attenuated the com-
petitors' aversion to ambiguity, insofar as they would tend to believe in their
relatively superior competence. 69 Nevertheless, the sense of comparative
ignorance underlying ambiguity aversion depends on one's perceptions of
relative task knowledge, as opposed to an abstract, generalized notion of
competence or skill. Here, therefore, where the future of an information
sharing arrangement depends greatly on the other party's private knowledge
and strategic intentions-because of economic factors such as the fear of
degradation-rivals are likely to perceive themselves as comparatively ig-
norant and therefore be more reluctant to embark on the arrangement.
VI. THE MANIFESTATION OF IMPEDIMENTS TO INFORMATION SHARING IN
DIFFERENT MARKET SETTINGS
Taken together, the analyses in this Article reveal that both economic
and behavioral impediments to information sharing are of greater concern
than previously thought. These impediments' presence may well spell a
substantial social loss and can cause especially significant and unfortunate
consequences. In critical infrastructure industries, for example, impediments
to information sharing may cause the maintenance of security vulnerabilities
that can be both harmful and costly to society at large. 
70
In general, the operation of economic and behavioral impediments indi-
cates that, on their own initiative, competing rivals will not always develop
168. Fox & Weber, supra note 166.
169. See supra notes 112-11 (discussing the evidence on managers' illusion of control), 125 (stating
that competition enhances the illusion of control) and accompanying text. See also The Fable of Entry,
supra note 17, at 505-08 (reviewing the evidence on decisionmakers' overestimations of their ability,
skill, and performance).
170. See, e.g., Emily Frye, Information-Sharing Hangups: Is Antitrust Just a Cover?, I CIP Rep. 6,
6-7 (2003); John McCarthy, Focus on Information Sharing, I CIP Rep. I, I (2003), available at
http:H/techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipplcip-reportlcip-report-1.8.pdf (both discussing the importance
of information sharing and the costs of a lack thereof in critical infrastructures).
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an information sharing arrangement whenever it would be socially benefi-
cial to do so.17' Nor will they even always embark on such an arrangement
whenever it is privately beneficial for them to do so. Nonetheless, impedi-
ments to information sharing do not exert a uniform impact across the
whole range of market settings, since the underlying circumstances that
generate a given barrier may simultaneously either diminish or reinforce the
significance of another.
Those purely economic impediments impact hypothetical, strictly ra-
tional competitors differently, depending on the expected private benefits
and costs of information sharing in different circumstances. Similarly, real-
life, boundedly rational competitors should not be expected always to face
identical impediments to information sharing either. After all, one of the
most fundamental insights of the behavioral literature is that human judg-
ment and decisionmaking is context-dependent to a greater degree than
analyses based on rational actor assumptions recognize. 
72
The following sections, therefore, begin charting the main factors that
determine the impact of various impediments in different circumstances.
Throughout this process, we also note the occasions where different im-
pediments tend to interact and affect one another.
A. Economic Impediments
The market structure and industry characteristics in any given case of
potential information exchange dictate both the likelihood and the severity
of free riding and degradation problems. The risk of free riding is significant
when the relevant information exhibits the characteristics of a public
good. 173 This will be the case, in particular, when the information is not
entirely excludable-that is, when the owner of the information cannot in-
crease the cost of obtaining the information to a level above the value of the
information to those in pursuit of the information. Hence, the more difficult
171. See Frye, supra note 170.
172. For a more detailed discussion and some applications of this point, see The Fable of Entry,
supra note 17, at 565-67. See also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behav-
ioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (asserting that the analyses of many
scholars using a behavioral approach to law and economics have been taking into account behavioral
differences between different legal actors); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 743-44 (2000) ("Study-
ing the effect of context has long been a part of psychology in general and [behavioral decision theory]
in particular. It is a core principle of psychological research that understanding a phenomenon requires
understanding when the phenomenon will occur and when it will not." (footnote omitted)). But see
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality. Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral
Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Equal Incompetence]
(arguing that legal scholars apply behavioral findings without regard to their differential impact on
different actors); Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (offering a more modest and nuanced ver-
sion of the above argument).
173. See, e.g., Lars H. Liebeler, Trademark Law, Economics, and Grey-Market Policv, 62 IND. L.J.
753, 755 n.13 (1986) ("Free-riding is most likely to occur when an organization provides a collective
benefit to its members.").
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the owner of information finds it to exclude others from obtaining it, the
more likely will free riding take place. Limited excludability may result
from a lack of intellectual property rights, from the high costs of enforcing
such rights, or from the ease of obtaining the information without the con-
sent of the owner (e.g., when the information is revealed by the information
owner's actions or by inexpensive reverse engineering).
On the other hand, degradation is more likely where the information
that could be shared is more excludable (i.e., the owner may increase the
cost for others to obtain the information) 74 and where the consumption of
the information by others is more rivalrous. For the rivalrous quality to ex-
ist, two conditions must be satisfied. First, a significant rival or potential
rival must exist. Therefore, the relevant industry must include at least one
rival or potential rival to the owner of the information,175with sufficient
market power to affect the owner of the information. 76 The first condition
is typically satisfied in those common oligopolistic markets. Second, there
must be a relative disadvantage from reciprocal information sharing with
that rival, where the benefit to one from receiving its rival's information is
lower than the benefit to the rival from receiving one's information. This
will happen, for instance, where the benefit from exchanging information
that enhances cyber-security is greater for one bank that provides many
online banking services than it is to its counterpart, which provides services
mainly by "brick and mortar" facilities.
Which industries are more vulnerable to degradation? Because informa-
tion sharing (like other forms of coordination) tends to be more essential in
network environments, 77 depriving a rival of information through degrada-
tion is likely to have a substantial effect in such industries. Of course, an
information exchange is meaningful only when different entities control
segmentsof the industry. If, in contrast, the network environment consists
of a single firm (e.g., a network industry controlled by the government), of
course degradation would make no sense.
Degradation is also infeasible when the network environment resembles
perfect competition-that is, where it consists of numerous tiny firms, none
of which are able to impact the market by its actions (i.e., each is a "price
taker"). 178 In such a market structure, strategic behavior is irrelevant since
174. If the information is entirely non-excludable, then the owner of the information cannot degrade
even if she finds it profitable to do so. This limit to the possibility of degradation, however, will be taken
into account ex ante by the potential owner, resulting in the free rider problem discussed above.
175. Even a monopolist might find it rational to degrade if a firm that currently does not participate in
the market (perhaps because its production costs are supra-marginal) could become an effective competi-
tor once it implements the shared information. Therefore, potential competitors may be sufficient for a
firm to justify a strategy of degradation.
176. This condition will also be met if the rival will only have sufficient power pursuant to its acquir-
ing the information.
177. See, e.g., Carlton & Klamer, supra note I, at 457; Lichtman, supra note 2, at 620-23.
178. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION




each individual firm can only respond to the market, not impact it. It makes
little sense to incur costs in depriving information to an insignificant small
rival, unless the small rival can divulge the information to a larger rival
whose actions impact the market. In an industry that is composed solely of
small firms, where no such larger competitor exists, there is no reason for
degradation.
Nonetheless, many markets that are susceptible to degradation exist be-
tween the extremes of absolute monopoly and perfect competition. 79 Most
often, these markets are oligopolies, 80 in which differentiated firms have
some idiosyncratic advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis their rivals. Deg-
radation could then effectively be used to exploit one firm's relative advan-
tages over its competitors.
Certain critical infrastructure industries, notably the energy, transporta-
tion, communications, and financial sectors, share these market characteris-
tics: They are network industries; control over activity in the industry is
private; there are some significant firms in the industry, but their number is
not large; and often, these firms differ in size, cost structures, and other per-
tinent characteristics.'" As a result of these characteristics, there are many
instances in which one firm can find it advantageous to refrain from sharing
information with its rival, in order to gain or maintain a competitive advan-
tage vis-A-vis that rival. In these cases, which resemble our example of pro-
spective cyber-security information sharing between two banks, because
rival firms significantly diverge in the utility that they stand to gain from
information exchange, these firms may decline even a mutually beneficial
exchange.
In sum, while both economic barriers--of free riding and degradation-
may significantly impede information sharing among competitors, the barri-
ers' most severe manifestations are unlikely to occur in the same market
settings. Where the relevant information is less excludable, free riding is a
greater threat, while in those circumstances where the information is more
excludable, degradation emerges as a more significant concern. Similarly,
where information is non-rivalrous, there is little risk of degradation; as the
conditions of the market make the relevant information become more rival-
rous, however, the impediment imposed by degradation increases its signifi-
cance.
179. See Aviram, supra note 49 (manuscript at 38-45).
180. See id. (manuscript at 29-30) (discussing market structures in which degradation is likely).
181. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdich, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Crea-
tion of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (2003) (analyzing the securities exchange
sector as a network industry); Carlton & Klamer, supra note I, at 454-64 (analyzing the railroad, tele-
phone, and electronic fund transfer industries as network industries); The National Strategy, supra note
10, at 8 ("Private industry owns and operates approximately 85 percent of our critical infrastructures and
key assets.").
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B. Behavioral Impediments
Much like the purely economic impediments, the impact of the behav-
ioral impediments to information sharing also depends on the nature of the
market and the relevant information in any given setting. Such market and
information characteristics will exert a direct behavioral impact on competi-
tors as well as erect economic impediments that, in turn, interact with some
of the behavioral phenomena.
Norms of rivalry, for instance, are likely to be more intense and there-
fore impede information sharing to a greater degree in sufficiently concen-
trated markets, where rivals continually and repeatedly battle with one an-
other. These norms may also exert some lesser impact in more competitive
markets, but the lack of specific past rivalry will typically diminish their
effect. On the other hand, in industries with a history of cooperation or col-
lusion among rivals, or in the case of rivals with extant business collabora-
tions, the identification of a mutually beneficial information sharing oppor-
tunity will be less affected by rivalry norms.
82
A past or present cooperative or collusive relationship among competi-
tors may also attenuate the effect of the illusion of control on managers'
judgments, leading the latter to perceive the risks involved in information
sharing as more controllable. Such a positive collaborative experience likely
will lead competitors to view prospective arrangements more positively,
diminishing the overestimation of risks and underestimation of benefits in-
volved in information sharing with rivals, due to the affect heuristic.
83
Nevertheless, the impact of risk attitudes will probably only be attenu-
ated, rather than totally eliminated, especially where there is a risk of free
riding or where the information is rivalrous. Free riding, after all, is the pro-
totypical uncontrollable risk that the competitor owning the information is
likely to perceive as more threatening than the "controllable" risks faced in
the daily management of one's business.184 In the same vein, the sharing of
rivalrous information raises the risk of degradation, whose materialization
depends on the decisions of one's rivals. These decisions, however, appear
as much more "uncontrollable" than the diffuse and faceless risks of compe-
tition in the market.
85
182. This will also be the case, for example, where current competitors have recently belonged to the
same corporate entity, such as when a company spins off a subsidiary or where the courts have ordered
the divestiture of a monopolist or merging firms.
183. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. Avishalom Tor, Behavioral Analysis of Antitrust Law: The Case of Resale Price Mainte-
nance 123-24 nn.293-99 (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the
illusion of control contributes to upstream managers' tendency to overestimate the risks of free riding by
discounting retailers as compared to those involved in controlling retail prices by means of resale price
maintenance).
185. There is also empirical evidence that decisionmakers in competitive settings tend to leave the
impact of the decisions of their counterparts out of focus, as long as this impact is "indirect"-meaning
that the competitor's decision does not directly determine the actor's outcomes. See Tor & Bazerman,
supra note 142; The Fable of Entr,, supra note 17, at 517-20 (summarizing the findings of the above
study and using them to explain why entrants overestimate the attractiveness of prospective non-
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Past experience with other collaborative ventures (pro- and anti-
competitive alike) can also diminish the ambiguity competitors associate
with limited information sharing. As explained above, the effect of ambigu-
ity aversion on decisionmakers' preferences is comparative-that is, de-
pending on their subjective perceptions of competence and knowledge re-
garding the different choices they have. 186 Consequently, successful past
collaborations will reduce the comparatively greater ambiguity typically
associated with prospective information sharing, leading in turn to a reduc-
tion in competitors' reluctance to embark on such an arrangement.
Furthermore, recent evidence on ambiguity aversion also suggests that
the parties' perceptions of whether the overall interaction between them is
competitive or cooperative can determine their concern with their compe-
tence vis-A-vis their counterparts.187 The more the parties will be inclined to
view their relationship as cooperative, the less they will be concerned about
their relative competence. 8 8 In this way, therefore, successful past collabo-
ration may operate to reduce the impediment of ambiguity aversion with
regard to the comparison between both the no-sharing and sharing options
and the competitors' relative competences.
While successful past collaboration may diminish the impact of ambi-
guity aversion, however, the fear of degradation is likely to exacerbate the
effect of this barrier. This exacerbation is prone to occur because the possi-
bility of degradation-which arises only where the relevant information is
rivalrous-means that the competitors' relative competences are directly
pitted against one another. The competitors' awareness of the idiosyncratic
advantages and disadvantages they have with regard to information sharing
will thus be heightened, resulting in an increased ambiguity aversion.
Finally, and unlike many of the other behavioral impediments to infor-
mation sharing, the status quo bias will typically be less affected by past
collusion or other collaborative experiences. 89 We have seen that this bias
results from both the prevalent aversion to losses from the status quo refer-
ence point and the asymmetry between action and inaction. 90 Loss aversion
is likely to exert its biasing effect regardless of past history, since the pre-
collaborative ventures).
186. See, e.g., Fox & Tversky, supra note 162; Fox & Weber, supra note 166; Heath & Tversky,
supra note 160.
187. See Fox & Weber, supra note 166 and accompanying text.
188. See id.
189. While the status quo bias tends to be robust across different market settings and industry condi-
tions, there will be some narrow settings that may diminish or even eliminate it. To wit, there is some
evidence that reference points other than status quo can impact choice. For example, when decisionmak-
ers are driven by a particular goal or aspiration, they may use these as reference points and view an
outcome that is above the status quo but below these points as failure to which they will be loss averse.
E.g., Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79 (1999). Under these
limited circumstances, competitors may exhibit risk seeking (the byproduct of loss aversion) instead of
the typical risk aversion for outcomes above the status quo.
190. See supra notes 126-44 and accompanying text.
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sent status quo will still be for each rival to continue vying for the greatest
competitive success without any collaboration with its counterpart.'9 '
Similarly, embarking on a new information sharing arrangement will
commonly involve action, while avoiding it typically will not. This asym-
metry will usually remain as long as the current state of affairs is competi-
tive. Therefore, the asymmetry may help sustain the status quo bias, even in
the face of past interactions. In some limited circumstances, however, omis-
sion biases will not reinforce the status quo barrier to information sharing
where the sharing of information can occur without any overt action on the
part of its owner. For instance, where the information is non-excludable and
free riding is likely to take place, omission biases will not reinforce the
status quo but rather diminish its inhibiting effect on information sharing.
Nevertheless, in those more common settings where the establishment of an
information sharing arrangement requires action on the part of competitors
and where the information is more excludable and rivalrous, the omission
bias will join loss aversion in impeding a move away from the no-sharing
status quo.
VII. OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS TO INFORMATION SHARING
The problems we addressed in this Article may sometimes be mitigated.
Mitigation strategies for information under-sharing, however, are not only
of limited efficacy, but also usually require a trade-off between promoting
beneficial information sharing and increasing the ease of collusion.
A. Private Legal Systems as a Means to Overcome Impediments
to Information Sharing
With regard to the one economic impediment to information sharing
that the literature has already recognized-namely, free riding-the solution
lies in overcoming a collective action problem: Firms may forego free rid-
ing on others' information in return for protection from free riding on their
own information. For example, in return for being paid to provide informa-
tion, these firms would be willing to pay for the information that they re-
ceive. However, such reciprocity is not self-enforcing, 92 and its external
enforcement usually requires costly collective action.
93
191. The most obvious exception to this rule would be, of course, when competitors are already
cooperating. In fact, where such cooperation is sufficiently significant-as in the case of a cartel-the
status quo bias will typically exert the opposite effect, contributing to the maintenance of the cartel. See
Developing a Behavioral Approach, supra note 17 (manuscript at 45-50).
192. At least, it is not self-enforcing among self-interested rational actors, although it may sometimes
be self-enforcing among real individuals. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 333, 333-34 (2001). According to Kahan:
In collective action settings, individuals behave not in the materially calculating fashion char-
acteristic of homo economicus but rather in the richer, more emotionally nuanced fashion ...
. When they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor,
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Nevertheless, the literature has identified institutions that solve or miti-
gate collective action problems. 194 Scholars describe, for example, how mer-
chant coalitions of Maghribi traders in the Middle Ages enabled these mer-
chants to share information efficiently on the honesty of agents and enforce
such honesty. 195 Similar institutions, or private legal systems, may be able to
mitigate the economic impediment of degradation by detecting the posses-
sion of information by one competitor and policing its disclosure to others.
However, there are some limitations to such institutions. First, they are
unlikely to form spontaneously, because enforcement costs would be high
and the newly formed institution would not have any sanction with which to
threaten firms that fail to obey. 196 To possess such sanctions, the institution
would need to rely on pre-existing networks, whose membership overlaps
with that of the group that is to be regulated (i.e., the firms that want to
share information) and which provide their membership with services that
are less costly to enforce (such as social utility). 97 Thus, since it is difficult
to artificially create such networks, membership in the information sharing
group needs to be structured in a way that would mimic the membership in
a pre-existing network.' 98
altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the inducement of
material incentives.
Id. In the present case, however, behavioral forces typically increase, rather than decrease, the severity of
collective action, because of the intense rivalry among competitors. Cf. id. ("When, in contrast, [real
individuals] perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are
moved by resentment and pride to retaliate. In that circumstance, they will withhold beneficial forms of
cooperation even if doing so exposes them to significant material disadvantage.").
193. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOALS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 1-2 (1965) (stating that in the original formulation of the problem, "[ulnless there is coercion or
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests."). See also Kahan, supra note 192, at
333. Kahan summarizes the collective action account as follows:
Absent externally imposed incentives, rational individuals, he argued, will rarely find it in
their interest to contribute to goods that benefit the group as a whole, but rather will "free
ride" on the contributions that other group members make. As a result, too few individuals
will contribute sufficiently, and the well-being of the group will suffer.
Id.
194. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and
Limitations, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 313 (2002) ("Institutions, including legal institutions, may be
invented in order to solve collective action problems by reducing transaction costs, providing informa-
tion, and increasing the credibility of commitments.").
195. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Magh-
ribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993).
196. See Aviram, supra note 68, at 9-21.
197. See id. at 21-26.
198. The Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ("ISACs"), which Presidential Decision Direc-
tive 63 envisioned as a key institution in facilitating information exchange among private owners and
operators of critical infrastructure, provide a significant case on point. See Critical Infrastructure Assur-
ance Office, The Clinton Administration's Policy On Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential
Decision Directive 63 (1998), at http://www.ciao.gov/resource/paper598.html (describing Presidential
Decision Directive 63, which is classified). So far, existing ISACs have been delineated by industry
(broadly defined), including Financial Services, Chemicals Industry, Electric Power, Emergency Fire
Services, Emergency Law Enforcement, Food, Information Technology, Interstate, Oil & Gas, Surface
Transportation, Telecommunications and Water Supply, and have enjoyed mixed success. See
McCarthy, supra note 170, at 4. See also Frye, supra note 170 (arguing that antitrust liability is unlikely
in most circumstances, and that a better explanation for the limited information sharing among ISAC
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A second limitation to private legal systems is their inability to deal
with degradation that exploits vulnerability to network effects. Contrast the
banks and telephone companies examples we used to illustrate the problem
of degradation in Part III. In the banks example, Bank B exploited Bank A's
greater vulnerability to cyber-security threats. If both banks were members
in a network that provides not only cyber-security protection but also other
benefits (e.g., interchange of ATM transactions so that a client of each bank
can use the ATM of any member of the network), then the network could
threaten Bank B that if it does not share information on cyber-security, it
would be expelled from the network and its clients would lose the ability to
use the ATMs of all the other banks. This may deter Bank B from declining
to share information.
In the case of the telephone companies, on the other hand, the larger
Goliath made it less vulnerable than the smaller David to the static noise on
the shared network. Threatening Goliath with expulsion would therefore not
deter it. In fact, Goliath may want to be expelled, so that customers of David
and the other phone companies with a combined market share of thirty per-
cent would not be able to call the customers of Goliath (who comprise sev-
enty percent of the market), and thus would migrate to Goliath. Apparently,
when degradation exploits vulnerability to network effects, private legal
systems based on networks are usually ineffective in reigning it in,' 99 and
even governmental regulation faces significant difficulties in detecting such
behavior.200
A third limitation to the efficacy of institutions that attempt to overcome
degradation (or free riding) is the trade-off between the benefits of efficient
information sharing and the costs of collusion. The same institutions that
increase the ability to share information on efficient production processes
also increase the ability to collude over prices, quality, territory, etc. From
the firms' perspective, both gains from more efficient production and gains
from collusion are equally welcome.2°' In fact, since degradation stems
from the firms' fear of competition from their rivals, private legal systems
may be tempted to solve the problem not by forcing firms efficiently to
share information despite this fear, but by quenching the very competition
that creates the incentive to degrade. Just as solutions that reduce sabotage
among coworkers result in a reduced incentive for each employee to ex-
members is lack of trust among them). Part of the reason for the difficulty that ISACs have in facilitating
information exchange may lie in their inability to overcome the degradation problem in the absence of a
pre-existing network that encompasses all of the ISAC members. The ISAC case therefore demonstrates
that private legal systems may only alleviate the problem of degradation among certain groups and only
if the information exchange is limited to those groups.
199. See Aviram, supra note 49 (manuscript at 44-48) (describing the lesser effectiveness a private
legal system's enforcement mechanisms have in regulating acts of degradation).
200. See id. (manuscript at 28-29) (describing the difficulties in detecting act of degradation or even
defining what acts would consist of degradation).
201. This would only be true insofar as there are no legal costs to collusion. In any case, however,
illegal collusion that is hard to detect and to convincingly prove leads to similar outcomes after the
limited legal costs are taken into account.
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cel,2°2 so do degradation solutions risk a reduction in firms' incentives to
compete as vigorously against each other.
In addition to facing the various limitations described here, any institu-
tion that seeks to address the problem of under-sharing information among
competitors must also overcome the behavioral barriers to such arrange-
ments. The behavioral findings described above support the conclusion that
facilitating institutions are unlikely to develop spontaneously, since their
development will be inhibited by some of the behavioral factors that impede
information sharing. Thus, rivalry norms will make competitors less likely
to recognize the advantages of impediment-overcoming institutions and the
biasing power of the status quo and ambiguity aversion will inhibit their
creation even where some of the benefits of these institutions are recog-
nized.
On those few occasions where a pre-existing private legal system can
provide the basis for an information sharing arrangement, its members will
also be aware that norms of cooperation may well apply. In this setting,
rivalry norms will be unlikely to slow down competitors' recognition of a
profitable information sharing opportunity, but they will also not inhibit
their ability to realize the benefits of, say, anticompetitive price coordina-
tion.
Similarly, a well functioning institution that effectively monitors the
relevant activities of its members, that has the ability to sanction them, and
that is one in which no member has disproportionate power over institu-
tional decisions, may help alleviate managers' biased perceptions of the
risks and benefits of information sharing. The presence of such an effica-
cious institution, however, will not only be rare but also lead competitors to
avoid a downward bias in judgments of collusive opportunities, increasing
their inclination to engage in anticompetitive behaviors.
The behavioral impediments in the domain of choice, on the other hand,
will benefit less from a reliance on pre-existing private legal systems in that
they will still be likely to impede both information sharing and collusive
behavior, if to a more limited degree. The status quo bias will probably not
be eliminated where private legal systems are present, since insofar as in-
formation sharing is concerned, competitive decisionmaking will provide
the reference point and generate loss aversion.20 3
202. See Chen, supra note 54, at 134-37 (suggesting strategies for alleviating the impact of sabotage
among coworkers, and assessing the trade-offs of each strategy).
203. Only where the pre-existing institution applies to such a broad range of activities that competi-
tion appears to be the exception instead of the rule will the status quo bias promote (rather than inhibit)
information sharing. Such occasions, however, will obviously be exceptionally rare and do not provide a
meaningful solution for the problem of under-sharing. In addition, as in the case of the judgments im-
pediments discussed above, the limited settings where broad collaboration is the rule inevitably promotes
collusion as well.
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B. Governmental Intervention to Overcome Impediments
to Information Sharing
External governmental intervention-whether a direct provision of in-
centives or an indirect facilitation of information sharing-may be able to
overcome some of the impediments examined here. These attempts, how-
ever, will typically be successful only to a limited degree and often (as has
been the case with private institutions) at the cost of making anti-
competitive collusion among these parties more likely as well. Furthermore,
any attempt at the governmental facilitation of information sharing will also
generate additional costs because of the need to detect those markets and
circumstances where such arrangements are socially beneficial and due to
the significant costs involved in the facilitation itself.2°4
These problems are likely to be especially severe where the direct pro-
vision of financial incentives to competitors-which would make informa-
tion sharing an attractive prospect despite, say, a risk of degradation-is
concerned. For instance, the direct provision of incentives would require the
government not only to identify circumstances where socially beneficial
information sharing is impeded, but also to determine the magnitude of the
social loss, as well as the magnitude of incentives necessary to overcome
the barriers. Otherwise, there will be no telling whether external interven-
tion is at all justified. Both of these determinations, however, are very diffi-
cult and costly to arrive at with any accuracy.
In principle, financial incentives may also be used to overcome the be-
havioral impediments to information sharing.205 After all, the effect of these
behavioral barriers is not completely to prevent information sharing but,
instead, to make it less likely to happen. Competitors' difficulty of identify-
ing objectively profitable opportunities for sharing information, or overes-
timates of the risks and costs and underestimates of the benefits of such
arrangements, only imply that their expected benefits must be significantly
larger than those strictly rational rivals would have required before they
decided to share information. Similarly, the strong preference of boundedly
rational competitors for the status quo, or for avoiding choosing compara-
tively more ambiguous options, only implies that they will demand far
204. Any governmental operation may be subject to a variety of problems and inefficiencies, which
have been discussed in some detail in the public choice literature and which are only exacerbated by the
complexity and uncertainty involving economic interactions in markets. See, e.g., The Fable of EntrY,
supra note 17, at 54647 & n.269 (citing additional sources and briefly discussing the similar problem
with regard to the more extreme possibility of regulating overconfident entry, with special reference to
regulation in the face of boundedly rational behavior).
205. In this case, the role of financial incentives is not to debias, for example, competitors' mistaken
judgments of the attractiveness of information sharing, but rather to take the bias as given and simply
make the arrangement subjectively more attractive. As a recent review of the empirical literature sug-
gests, the former attempt would not be effective. See Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects
of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework,
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1059.pdf, at 17 (noting that "all established anomalies have
essentially survived" attempts to make them disappear by raising incentives, although incentives do tend
to diminish the variance of participants (emphasis omitted)).
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greater perceived benefits-in proportion to the perceived risks and costs-
before they embark on a novel information sharing arrangement.
2 6
Nevertheless, while the "stickiness" of competitors' behavior may be
overcome by the provision of sufficiently great additional incentives, the
high costs involved in these additional incentives will often make the inter-
vention inefficient.207 Only in very limited circumstances-where the net
social benefits from information sharing are dramatically larger than the
private ones but these private benefits are still too small to overcome the
various impediments without intervention-would providing competitors
with large additional incentives be socially beneficial.
The provision of incentives may be of limited use in the case of infor-
mation sharing, but where the information to be shared is easily defined,
and failure to provide it is easily detected, the government may be able to
mandate specific information exchanges. In other words, the government
may replace private ordering in punishing degradation. An example of such
regulation may be found in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
Order 497, which regulates information sharing among pipelines, as well as
between pipelines and their affiliates. °8
Governmental intervention in these circumstances may be crucial to
mitigating degradation because private legal systems are at a disadvantage
compared to the government in punishing degradation: The strongest private
sanctions are typically based on exclusion from the network, yet a degrader
would not be deterred by such sanction, since the very goal of degradation
is reducing one's connection with the network.2° Public sanctions, such as
incarceration and fines, are better able to punish degradation.
On the other hand, however, the public enforcement mechanism (be it
courts or regulatory agencies) typically does not have an advantage over
private ordering in determining what consists degradation (i.e., what infor-
mation cannot be withheld from competitors) and the detection of attempts
of degradation. 10 Moreover, a vaguely defined governmental mandate for
intervention in a broad range of market activities can be costly and prob-
lematic. Thus, a role for governmental intervention would be easier to jus-
tify in cases in which these latter issues are relatively clear or inexpensive to
ascertain.
The government may also be an efficient regulator when degradation
creates externalities that harm persons who are not constituents of the pri-
206. For example, the average coefficient of loss aversion has been estimated at about 2 (i.e., a ratio
of 2:1 for gains versus losses of equal magnitude) for small or moderate monetary gains and losses as
well in some non-monetary settings, although various factors can increase or decrease this ratio. See,
e.g., Kahneman et al., supra note 20; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 127.
207. Especially given the difficulties and costs involved even in providing incentives only to over-
come those purely economic impediments to information sharing we discussed above.
208. See FERC Order No. 497, supra note 9. See also Tenneco Gas v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1187 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (explaining this order).
209. See supra text accompanying note 199. See also Aviram, supra note 49, manuscript at 53-55
(discussing this point in greater detail).
210. See id.
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vate legal system, and for whose interests, therefore, the private legal sys-
tem might not cater.21 This may explain the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion's role in regulating disclosure of information on firms that issued secu-
rities to the public. A traded firm may often have an interest in keeping
much information confidential, since its rivals could benefit from acquiring
this information.21 2 This nondisclosure, however, causes a negative exter-
nality on outside shareholders, whose shares' value is diminished due to the
reduced accuracy of the market price, as well as by the risk that insiders
may exploit their informational advantage. Thus, even if all firms were to
overcome the collective action problem and agree on a standard for what
information should be disclosed, they would not consider the full negative
impact of withholding information on shareholders.2 3 Forcing firms to in-
ternalize this externality may provide a role for government. 2 4
Additionally, the government may be able to facilitate information shar-
ing by setting the correct balance in the trade-off between degradation and
collusion and thus, where appropriate, reducing competitors' incentives to
engage in degradation. As we have explained above, degradation stems
from the competition between the performer of the degradation and its vic-
tims. The government, through its control of competition laws and competi-
tion enforcement agencies, may opt for either a stricter or a more lenient
enforcement of laws against collusion formed by information sharing. All
else being equal, the stricter the enforcement, the greater the incentive to
degrade; conversely, the more lenient the enforcement, the lower the incen-
tive to degrade, but also the greater the likelihood that firms will collude. To
the extent that government best internalizes the incentives of all stake-
holders, it may be in the best position to determine the optimal trade-off
between collusion and degradation and scale its enforcement efforts accord-
ingly.
215
When the impediment to information sharing is free riding rather than
degradation, a subtler form of government intervention may take place. If
the free riding impediment is caused by a difficulty for the firms involved to
211. See id.
212. Whether or not such withholding of information is degradation depends on whether it is efficient
from society's viewpoint to disclose the information (in which case, the withholding of information is a
form of degradation).
213. Similarly, they would not take into account the negative impact of releasing information-to the
extent this facilitates collusion-on consumers.
214. Some scholars believe that privately-owned stock exchanges consider the interests of minority
shareholders (because the small shareholders would vote with their feet in favor of exchanges that regu-
lated issuers in a way that protects minority shareholders). For a critique of this view (in the context of
commodities exchanges), see Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commoditv Exchanges: The
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1995). Even if exchanges do internalize small
shareholders' interests, the private regulation of degradation by exchanges is still likely to face a relative
disadvantage (compared to public enforcement) in punishing degradation.
215. This is not to say that there is always a trade-off between collusion and degradation. Sometimes,
more lenient antitrust enforcement would allow (welfare-reducing) collusion while not resulting in less
degradation. This is because either there is no significant incentive for degradation or degradation is
more costly to the would-be degrader than the benefits she would derive from it. In such cases, strict
enforcement of antitrust laws would not increase the likelihood of degradation.
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agree on a specific standard for information sharing, government may nar-
row the range of possible standards to ease the convergence of firms to one
standard, while still allowing firms to freely decide on the standard that is
most suitable for them.2 16 This can be done, for example, through the gov-
ernmental formation of voluntary information sharing programs, with pre-
arranged (but modifiable) rules of exchange. An effort in this direction is
illustrated by the establishment of voluntary Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers to mitigate threats to critical infrastructure.21 7
Finally, another, more broadly applicable, approach may sometimes be
available for overcoming the behavioral barriers to information sharing, by
addressing competitors' boundedly rational judgment and choice head-on in
an attempt to align their subjective perceptions and preferences with the
normative expectations of rational actor models. 21 8 For instance, overcom-
ing norms of rivalry may be possible, since norms do appear to change over
time and to be amenable-at least to some degree-to outside manipula-
219tion. Interestingly, moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that a
successful norm manipulation may also diminish the inhibiting effect of
ambiguity aversion on competitors' choice to share information.22 0 Never-
theless, as with those institutions aimed at curbing the economic impedi-
ments, any intervention that turns successful in making partial cooperation
among rivals-such as information sharing-more legitimate and accept-
able will also tend to facilitate anticompetitive collusion among them.
Debiasing competitors' judgments of the risks and benefits of informa-
tion sharing, on the other hand, is likely to prove a much harder task. In fact,
the limited evidence reveals that successful debiasing is uncommon and
typically requires intensive interventions that are irrelevant in the present
216. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing law's role in signaling preferred alternatives and thus
narrowing options to reduce the cost to private parties of solving "Meeting Place" types of interaction
problems).
217. Supra note 197.
218. Of course, unlike a solution based on providing greater financial incentives, this approach can,
at best, only overcome the behavioral but not the economic barriers to information sharing. In other
words, seeking a solution to behavioral impediments, this approach attempts to impact competitors'
subjective views of information sharing without changing the objective private benefits and costs of
these arrangements.
219. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 733 (1999) (describing norm change by "availability entrepreneurs"); McAdams,
supra note 93, at 391-408 (discussing norm change and the possibility of regulating norms); Sunstein,
supra note 93, at 909, 929-30 (discussing mechanisms of norm change and how they can be used by
"norm entrepreneurs").
220. See Fox & Weber, supra note 166, at 489-91 (finding ambiguity aversion with participants are
sensitive to the relative competence of their counterpart when playing a simple competitive (matching
pennies) game, but not when playing a noncompetitive (coordination) game that has the same mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium). See also Colin F. Camerer & R. Karjalainen, Ambiguity Aversion and Non-
Additive Beliefs in Noncooperative Gaines: Experimental Evidence, in MODELS AND EXPERIMENTS IN
RISK AND RATIONALITY 325 (B. Munier & M. J. Machina eds., 1994) (finding that most respondents
would rather bet on a chance device (e.g., the flip of a coin) than against the play of another person (e.g.,
one who faces a choice between two strategies with symmetrical consequences)).
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case.221 Similarly, outside intervention aimed at overcoming the biasing
effect of the status quo may be difficult, given the status quo's natural role
as a reference point. 222 However, insofar as an intervention can generate
effective alternative reference points, for instance, by creating an environ-
ment where information is shared by default, it may be able to overcome or
at least diminish the status quo bias. If such a complex endeavor were suc-
cessful, the default setting could create a new reference point, and in any
case make the no-sharing choice a commission instead of an omission, thus
reducing the power of the no-sharing status quo.
In sum, our tentative exploration of possible means to overcome the
economic and behavioral impediments to information sharing among com-
petitors has revealed the myriad of difficulties and costs involved in this
task. This is not to say, of course, that private legal systems or governmental
arrangements will never be helpful in mitigating the social costs of sub-
optimal information sharing, only that their ability to generate a social bene-
fit is limited.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Information sharing may be a boon or a bane, depending on the circum-
stances. But whether it is good or ill, an assessment of the likelihood of in-
formation sharing is important for numerous areas of law and policy. The
existing theoretical framework overstates the likelihood of information shar-
ing in many circumstances because it ignores several important impedi-
ments to the sharing of information. In this Article we begin charting this
new territory.
We started, in Part II, with a cause the literature has not neglected-the
free rider (or collective action) problem. Part III then examined the problem
of degradation-an economic constraint on information sharing that has yet
to receive the literature's attention. While Parts II and III addressed phe-
nomena that cause a divergence between the social and private cost-benefit
calculus, however, the analysis in these Parts assumed that competitors
would always opt to share information when the private benefits of such an
arrangement outweigh its private costs. Parts IV and V, on the other hand,
challenged this assumption, examining real-world behavioral phenomena
that may cause firms to exhibit levels of information sharing that are even
privately-not only socially-sub-optimal.
In Part IV we focused on managers' judgments, arguing that competi-
tors will not recognize an opportunity for limited cooperation by informa-
tion sharing as swiftly as extant models assume. The two main causes of
this effect we have identified were, first, the persistence of rivalry norms;
221. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in governmental interventions aimed to debias
market participants, as well as in debiasing more generally, see The Fable of Entry, supra note 17, at
nn.271-74 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Kahneman et al., supra note 20; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 134.
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and second, an underestimation of the risks and costs of maintaining a
purely competitive relationship as compared to those involved in embarking
on a novel information sharing arrangement. Part V examined competitors'
choice behavior, arguing that the status quo bias and comparative ambiguity
aversion can lead market participants consciously to forego new profitable
opportunities for limited cooperation, unless these opportunities' overall
estimated value significantly-not just marginally-outweighs that of con-
tinuing the purely competitive status quo.
Building on the analysis in Parts II-V, we began in Part VI the task of
integrating our insights regarding the various economic and behavioral bar-
riers. The framework we started developing in this Part reveals how differ-
ent impediments exert a more or less severe impact on information sharing
in different settings. We also found that some of the factors that generate
impediments to information sharing interact and reinforce one another under
specific circumstances.
Finally, Part VII explored a variety of strategies that might help over-
come barriers to information sharing. We examined the potential role of
both private institutions and external governmental intervention. Our analy-
sis showed that each of these sources of intervention, as well as the different
means available to them, may be more effective than its counterpart in dif-
ferent circumstances. The analysis has also revealed circumstances where
none of the available strategies is likely to be socially beneficial or effica-
cious; in these cases, therefore, the presence of impediments to information
sharing must be taken into account as a given.
The insights of this Article have numerous legal and policy applications
that merit further study, in antitrust law and well beyond. First, understand-
ing the impact of sub-optimal information sharing is important for many
areas of antitrust analysis, including horizontal mergers, joint ventures, and
divestitures.223 In all of these areas, an overstatement of the likelihood of
information sharing among competitors can lead to an illegalization of, or
the imposition of excessive restrictions on, some beneficial horizontal ar-
rangements or transactions. Second, an analysis of sub-optimal information
sharing is also central to the formulation of public policy regarding network
industries and critical infrastructures more generally. Not only is the role of
information sharing in such markets highly significant, but the importance
of these industries for the vitality of the national economy can hardly be
overstated.224 And third, a more accurate assessment of the likelihood of
information sharing may also advance the analysis of procedural rules, since
the facilitation of information exchange is an important consideration in the
shaping of the rules of pre-litigation discovery proceedings. Insofar as the
extant scholarship overstates the likelihood of information exchange among
litigants, the impediments to information sharing examined here may pro-
223. See supra notes 6-8.
224. See supra notes 9-10.
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vide useful insights regarding proper scope of discovery and privilege,
whose efficacy may currently be overstated.225
225. See supra notes I 1- 12.

